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30 December 1985

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 10, OCTOBER 1985

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WASHINGTON'S PACIFIC OCEAN STRATEGY VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 85 (signed to press 18 Sep 85) pp 3-14

[Article by G. A. Trofimenko: "On Washington's Pacific Ocean Strategy"]

[Text] The thesis that the Pacific Ocean will become the Mediterranean Sea of the 21st century has now become an axiom in the United States. Hence the conclusion is made that the United States must adjust to this fact. The new Pacific Ocean strategy of the United States is being discussed more and more frequently in the press and in academic circles.

A careful analysis of the facts clearly shows that the United States still does not have any kind of integral Pacific strategy. But there are American business organizations that are oriented to the Pacific region and, in particular, there is the U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, which was formed in the fall of 1984. The Department of State has introduced the position of ambassador for special assignments, whose responsibility is to coordinate government measures concerning the Pacific basin and to prepare the appropriate documents on the basis of consultations with countries of the region. Finally, there is the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, to which the American Armed Forces, including, first and foremost, the formations of the U.S. Navy's Third and Seventh fleets, are subordinate in a region covering a total of 245 million square kilometers.

However, despite all of this, it is still hardly possible to speak about the existence of any broad Pacific political strategy. This is due to a number of circumstances: American political analysts and politicians only recently began to consider the need for a complex and comprehensive approach to the problems of the Pacific basin. The heterogeneity of the countries in the region makes it difficult to use some kind of standard yardstick for the approach to them and to formulate the universal basic principles of a pertinent policy. In the 1970's Washington was obsessed in Asia, first, with the problem of the Vietnam war and, later, with relations with Japan and the PRC. The American "think tanks" only gradually began to form a conceptual approach to the Asian-Pacific region as a possible geopolitical community. Therefore, in the mid-1980's the United States is still in the process of groping for a Pacific strategy.

Basic Reasons for Forming a Pacific Ocean Strategy

All of the main centers of the contemporary multipolar world--the USSR, the United States, the PRC and Japan--with the exception of the European Economic Community (EEC), seem to meet in the Asian-Pacific "focus."¹

For many years after the end of World War II the Soviet Union represented the main object of attention of U.S. foreign policy. Washington's main political diplomatic efforts were centered on the policy of the so-called "containment" of the USSR, and these efforts were reinforced by the nuclear arms race and by "deterrence" from a position of strength.

Under these conditions, U.S. Asian-Pacific policy represented only a regional aspect of the U.S. policy of "cold war" and bipolar military confrontation. However, the aggravation of international relations in the last two decades, the formation of new power centers such as Japan and China, the conclusion of the process of decolonization and the simultaneous strengthening of the non-aligned movement and decline of the United States' relative weight in the global balance have forced Washington to pursue a more flexible foreign policy. Although attention in the American Government's foreign policy continues to be centered on the Soviet Union, the regional balances are now much more important to the United States than in the past. These circumstances provide the main incentives and motives for the formation of a special Asian-Pacific area of U.S. policy.

The importance of the Pacific region in U.S. economic activity is growing. The proportional share of that region in the overall volume of American foreign trade now amounts to 30 percent and is still growing.

The importance of western states (Hawaii, California, Oregon, Washington and Alaska), oriented to the Pacific Ocean, in the political and economic structure of American society is growing. They account for more than 80 percent of U.S. commercial trade with countries of the Asian-Pacific region. In terms of its total goods and services (worth about 500 billion dollars), California alone could occupy eighth place among the world's industrial states--ahead of, for instance, Canada and Italy. California is now the most populous state in America. It has the highest growth rate in urban districts: The population of Los Angeles increased by 1.5 million in the 1970's. "The old New York-Chicago economic and financial axis is being replaced by the new Los Angeles-Houston axis,"² J. Naisbitt, researcher of megatrends in the development of American society, noted. The role of representatives of western and southern states in the American establishment, which has traditionally been oriented toward Europe and Anglo-Saxon traditions, is also growing.

The assumption of power by the Reagan Administration in 1981 resulted in an absolute strengthening of representation of "new money"--the southern and western financial-monopolist circles that have grown and flourished in recent decades--in the U.S. ruling elite.

Following his arrival in the White House in 1969, R. Nixon, the first U.S. president who objectively and subjectively represented the new economic

forces in American society, considered his main task to be, in his own words, "to break the hammerlock Washington holds over the money and decisions that affect American lives" and to "get new blood from the South, the West and the Midwest" into the elite.³ However, he only succeeded in shaking the old Eastern establishment and not in "liquidating" it. On the contrary, having united on an anti-Nixon platform, the latter liquidated Nixon! But Reagan, personifying the same forces as Nixon, who was the first postwar president to turn toward Asia, succeeded in what Nixon had failed to achieve.

Under Reagan the "Grand Old Party" (as the Republicans are customarily called in the United States) has turned into a "grand new party," A. Haig notes in his memoirs. Its core is a coalition of former southern Democrats and western populists.⁴

The reorientation of the establishment away from Europe and toward Asia has noticeably intensified as a result of the infusion of the "new blood" into it. "What is taking place in the Philippines, Japan and Korea has a much greater effect on us and interests us much more directly than most events in Massachusetts,"⁵ S. Hayakawa, the American senator from California, has said.

The scientifically and technologically most advanced industries (aerospace, electrical engineering, electronics, robotics and instrument building) and the most intensive agricultural production are centered in the southern and western states. California alone accounts for 40 percent of all workers and employees engaged in the country's production of weapons and ammunition. This state receives more than half of all orders from the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and about one-third of all Defense Department orders.⁶

Wide-ranging economic cooperation arrangements with business circles in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and others seem increasingly attractive to the broadest segments of the U.S. business community. Hence it is no accident that in recent years U.S. capital investments have increased at the highest rates precisely in that region. They have increased by 65 percent in the last 5 years, whereas the overall capital investments of the United States abroad increased by 39 percent.⁷

In fact, the most up-to-date areas of the radio engineering and electronic industries are developing at the fastest rates precisely in the Pacific region. The forms of cooperation considered promising by American businessmen are being worked out and the market economy is being strengthened in the region on the basis of cooperation between American monopolies and the new industrial states of the region. In this way, an American model of the "new economic order" is being created in the region.

In his book "The World After Oil. The Shifting Axis of Power and Wealth," which has caused a great stir, B. Nussbaum gives a colorful but accurate description of the psychology of the new American pioneers of the "Pacific frontier": "The individuals building the new America of advanced technology have a very specific set of values which sets them apart from the old northeastern and midwestern heart of the country. In fact, they have much more in common with the old (American) frontier spirit of the 19th century and with

its pioneers and robber barons than with the managerial style of the contemporary leaders of big business. And they are the ones who are creating the new Pacific frontier, a frontier that is based as much on the physical geography of the (American) west as it is based on the specific 'hot mixture' of seething inventiveness, ebullient economic activity and hundreds of 'nascent' tiny new firms. The new Pacific frontier is an absolutely new frontier of mind and spirit, a frontier of scientific discoveries and engineering inventions, a frontier of men spearheading technological progress and joining together with the new type of entrepreneurs who have created new forms of fierce capitalism, the like of which has not been seen since the days when Vanderbilt, Rockefeller, Ford and Mellon were laying the old industrial foundation of the country."⁸

The growth of independent trends in the foreign policy of West European countries and the deepening contradictions between the United States and the West European NATO countries are combining to encourage Washington's leading circles to distance themselves from Europe and encourage Europe's own, independent rearming. The "Asian model" of U.S. relations with allies and "friendly states," the relations that are freer and more flexible than those within NATO, appears more and more attractive to the American leadership, not only in relation to Asia but also in relation to Europe.

Over the years the idea of creating "two fronts" against the Soviet Union has become ingrained in the military-political thinking and the military buildup of the United States. Under the conditions of the establishment of Soviet-American strategic parity and, consequently, a certain depreciation of the American nuclear potential, U.S. strategic thinking is turning toward possibilities for non-nuclear armaments and for the "horizontal escalation" of armed operations against the USSR with conventional weapons and from many directions. This is heightening the American Government's interest in the Asian region.

The qualitative renovation of the American sea-based nuclear armaments (the appearance of the new sea-based Trident missile system and the equipping of surface ships and strike submarines with the long-range nuclear cruise missiles) has also heightened the interest of American military circles in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

The processes of social ferment in many young Asian and Latin American states, which are connected with the conclusion of anticolonial revolutions (something that has given rise to Z. Brzezinski's theory of the "crescent of crisis") are drawing Washington's attention toward the military-force methods of ensuring American interests in the region. American politicians count on being able to restrict their military operations for the prevention of objectionable changes in the countries of the region to local boundaries. This also dictates the elaboration of a more comprehensive and flexible military strategy.

The concept of "trilaterality," which provided one of the theoretical props of the foreign policy of Carter's administration, is now clearly out of fashion. The American leadership has recognized that the idea of forming a

broad alliance of the world's developed capitalist countries under the aegis of the United States, aimed against the socialist and developing countries, could not be realized effectively for a number of reasons (for instance, because of the increased independence and self-reliance of West European countries and because of their attempts to restore their own positions in the developing world on a new basis. These positions had been partly usurped by the United States during the course of its neocolonial expansion in the "Third World," which accompanied the process of the formal liberation of the colonies).

Therefore, instead of pursuing an unattainable "trilaterality," Washington is concentrating on the protection of its own global interests against the pretensions of its West European allies and Japan. In view of the fact that the United States and other countries realize the prospective significance of the Asian and Pacific region for world economics and the military-political balance, Washington is striving to outpace the latter and to seize the initiative in order to strengthen its positions in the region in the growing competitive struggle with Japan and the developed European capitalist countries. It can be said that expectations and hopes can stimulate events: The mood of the present American leadership in favor of the exceptionally great importance of the Pacific basin for the United States and the entire world leads it to actions and reactions that confirm and reinforce this "Asian mood."

The possibility of the radical improvement of relations between the USSR and the PRC and the coordination of their opposition to Washington's hegemonist pretensions hangs over Washington as a constant nightmare. One of the main goals of the budding U.S. Pacific strategy is to prevent the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and the intensification of anti-imperialist elements in PRC policy.

Finally, the crude resources of the Pacific Ocean, including ocean resources, which are obviously colossal although largely unexplored, are among the factors representing the conceptual building blocks of the Pacific strategy.

Now even American military circles are calling for the elaboration of a national ocean strategy for the 21st century which would also include socio-political aspects as elements of military strategy and national ocean policy.⁹ The Stratton Commission, working on the problems of U.S. ocean policy, pointed out in its 1969 report: "The security of the United States, its ability to satisfy growing demands for food and raw materials, its position and influence in the world community and the quality of the environment will depend largely on the extent to which the United States uses the sea thoroughly and carefully in the coming decade."¹⁰

American strategists and politicians are also taking account of the demographic potential of the region's countries and of the existence of a cheap labor force in these countries. The possibilities for its exploitation under the conditions of the global scientific and technical revolution represent an important socioeconomic aspect in which broad segments of the American business community and the academic community serving it are interested.

Uniting all of these contradictory elements, interests and positions into a purposeful, long-term and comprehensive strategy is an extraordinarily difficult task, if not an impossible one. For this reason, U.S. Pacific strategy is now being developed along several lines, between which there is still little connection and which are even mutually contradictory at times. The following three components should be singled out as the main ones: military-political, economic, and ideological.

The U.S. Military-Political Strategy in the Region

The main elements of military-political strategy in the Pacific basin are reliance on forward-based naval forces and reliance on island bases.

The Seventh Fleet is the United States' main strike force in the western Pacific. Its tasks at this stage are to control the maritime communications in that region and in the eastern Indian Ocean and to show the U.S. flag to potential enemies, to neutral states and, just in case, also to "friends." The American press sometimes writes about a nascent naval cooperation between the United States and the PRC, invoking in this connection the visit of J. Lehman, secretary of the Navy, to China in August 1984, and the planned exchange of visits by naval ships. However, it seems that the real possibilities for this kind of cooperation are equal to zero. The United States will not even lift a finger to help in any way to strengthen and develop China's naval forces. After all, the U.S. naval forces in the region represent the main American trump card against any attempts by the PRC to solve the Taiwan problem by military force. The only thing in which Washington can be interested is to demonstrate to Beijing the unattainability of naval superiority to the United States even along China's own coasts.

The main function of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is to exert pressure on the USSR from the eastern flank. The military maneuvers held regularly in the north-western Pacific since the fall of 1982 attest to the priority of this function. In 1983, 3 aircraft carriers, 40 other warships and more than 250 aircraft of the U.S. Navy and Air Force and 4 Canadian ships participated in these maneuvers not far from Kamchatka. The official purpose of the maneuvers was to work out the new naval concept of "flexible options" ("Flexops"), providing for transfers of the main strike forces of the Navy from one region to another and for their concentration in the appropriate "pressure points." As THE LOS ANGELES TIMES noted, however, the unofficial purpose was to "notify Moscow" that the United States intends to complicate Soviet defense planning to the maximum.¹¹

The nuclear threat to the USSR's eastern regions has essentially increased in view of the deployment of the new Trident submarine missile system in the Pacific Ocean,¹² the equipping of U.S. submarines with the Tomahawk strategic cruise missiles¹³ and the deployment of the B-52 heavy strategic bombers, which carry the air-to-ground nuclear cruise missiles, in the region. The buildup of the U.S. naval forces is taking place in the immediate vicinity of Soviet shores. It is clear that this new situation will force the Soviet Union to take the appropriate countermeasures. It can be assumed that, despite all of the so-called parallel interests of the United States and the

PRC, China will also begin to react in a similar way at some time to the growth of the American naval potential in the region.

As American officials constantly stress, Japan continues to represent the cornerstone of the American strategy of "forward-based defense" in the Asian and Pacific region.¹⁴ In accordance with this principle, Washington is constantly urging Tokyo to be more active in the arms race. The pace of this arms race increased perceptibly following the conclusion of the American-Japanese accord on the division of military functions in the region and following the assumption of power in Japan by Nakasone's government. "Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone, who understands the realities of global security..., greater emphasis has been placed on defense," R. Armitage, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, noted during hearings in the House of Representatives in June 1984. "The expenditures of most ministries and departments, including education, public affairs and social insurance, were either frozen or reduced in the two budgets presented by the Nakasone cabinet. At the same time, appropriations for defense were increased by more than 6 percent annually."¹⁵

However, it must not be forgotten that Japan is simultaneously satisfying the Americans' demands in the sphere of military buildup and striving to find new opportunities for itself to demonstrate its strength in the region and to weaken Washington's pressure for more balanced Japanese-American trade.

In order to strengthen its positions in the region, Washington has tried to play the role of a special unofficial coordinator of the military policies of Japan, South Korea, Australia and the ASEAN countries by striving to reinforce those elements in the military buildup of the aforementioned states which follow a clear anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnam line and can also be used as a "deterrent" against the DPRK. In other words, Washington hopes that in Asia, even more than in Europe, it will succeed in shifting a substantial part of the burden of anti-Soviet confrontation onto its allies and unofficial partners.

In the broad historical context, the United States' efforts are aimed at preventing the possible formation of a Japanese-Chinese bloc on an anti-American basis and the weakening of confrontational elements in Japan's military policy toward the USSR and in China's military policy toward the USSR and the SRV.

The "Pacific Community" as a Possible Instrument of American Influence

Washington is aware that the United States will be unable to prevent any possible undesirable changes in the policy of a number of the region's countries by means of purely military measures and military assistance. The nature of these changes is indicated by the current position of New Zealand, an ANZUS member, which has disallowed the entry of New Zealand ports by foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons, by the development of the socio-political situation in the Philippines, which is threatening the U.S. use of bases in this country, by Australia's increased restraint in the sphere of military cooperation with the United States, and so forth.

It is precisely for these reasons that Washington is now advocating stronger economic cooperation between the countries of the region, having in mind the perfectly specific ultimate goal of ensuring that the overwhelming majority of countries in the region will continue to develop according to the "American pattern" and be more likely to accept the influence of the powerful economic potential of the United States and its transnational corporations. It is prepared to reconcile itself to political changes in a number of developing countries on one condition--that such changes do not lead to radical social reforms and to the assumption of power by leftwing or even rightwing nationalist forces that would sharply limit the possibilities of American economic and political influence (as in the case of Iran). It is calculated in Washington that the United States will be able to direct the process of change, including changes in the regional military balance, as long as the countries of the region continue to stay within the orbit of American capitalism.

The American administration and the business circles close to it are now making an exceptional effort to promote the idea of the "Pacific community." It is significant that the formation of this kind of community was proposed by R. Nixon in his statement on future U.S. policy in Asia, published a year before his victory in the 1968 presidential elections. The article underscored the "westward (Pacific--O. T.) shift of American interests" and contained an appeal to the United States to take a more active part--using less flagrant methods--in the formation of Asian regionalism. "Without turning our back on Europe, we must now move west--toward the East--to form the muscles of a Pacific community.

"This should be a community in the full sense of the word, including the community of goals, mutual understanding, mutual assistance and the coordination of military and defense measures with measures to strengthen the economy."¹⁶

The idea of a Pacific community was given its second life in the 1980's as a result of its active support by both the United States and Japan (although Tokyo naturally does not see this idea in the same way as Washington). The next move toward the implementation of this concept was provided by the ASEAN countries' de facto renunciation of the veto they had once placed on this project in the fear that its realization would make the consolidation of their own association more difficult. The special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers with officials from the developed countries of the basin (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Japan) to discuss Pacific affairs and the consolidation of the practice of such conferences (the second meeting was held this summer) have given Washington and Tokyo the hope that the idea of the Pacific community might take concrete form within the near future.

The American goal is to begin with the interaction of the six ASEAN countries, to gradually include South Korea and the Pacific island states in this process and to create some kind of more or less organized Pacific economic infrastructure in which the United States would play the first violin and dominate the system of communications and the dissemination and processing of information.

To avoid provoking unnecessary conflicts in organizing a community of countries that are extremely heterogeneous, ethnically and sociopolitically as well as in their religious beliefs, the United States proposes to start with supposedly non-controversial joint projects, such as programs for the perfecting of human resources and the exploitation of ocean resources. If we take a closer look, however, we see that these programs correspond primarily to the interests of the United States from the standpoint of its economic expansion during the new stage of the scientific and technical revolution. How can the colossal human resources of the developing countries of the basin be exploited in a way that will benefit American corporations and not lead to intensified economic competition on the part of states that have almost joined the ranks of developed countries? What should be doled out to the countries of the region to induce them to sanction the intensified activity of American monopolies on their coastal shelves and support Washington's opposition to the new law of the sea that was worked out by the UN special conference? These are the problems which the United States intends to solve jointly with other potential members of the "Pacific community."

By putting forward the "adherence of the country to the market economy" as the main criterion for its admission to membership in the community, the United States is deliberately excluding the possibility of participation by socialist or developing countries which have embarked on the road of a nationalized economy.

According to this criterion, China cannot apply for membership, although Washington now describes it as a country friendly to the United States in the military-political sense.¹⁷ However, in view of the market economy experiment initiated by China, the expansion of the "free trade zone" will be used by the United States to exaggerate the prospects of the "open door" for China as a "reward for good behavior." According to Washington's thinking, this "good behavior" must be demonstrated by Beijing in the economic sphere and also in relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, which will supposedly provide an opportunity to judge China's "real intentions."

Therefore, according to the plans of American politicians, the aforementioned economic organization should reinforce the informal political association--under the U.S. aegis--of the states that stand against the USSR and its allies in Asia. In other words, the so-called long-term strategic thinking of the United States sees within this plan no other picture of development of the situation in East Asia at the turn of the century than the very same confrontational model which has been firmly set in the minds of American leaders since the end of World War II.

The Information Offensive

The most farsighted representatives of the American establishment understand the incompatibility of the values of the U.S. capitalist society, the American way of life and the American culture with the values and traditions of Asians. The late American futurologist H. Kahn once noted: "To the Asian countries, the United States represents a special kind of decadence and even a cultural and social threat to some of their most fundamental values."¹⁸ "Cultural

"incompatibility" represents an essential obstacle not only to the Pacific integration process but also to the activities of American businessmen in Asia.

American ruling circles put great hopes in the "universality of American business practices and business ethics," which, they say, can serve as "bridges" between the cultures and values of Asians and the "values of American civilization." In precisely the same way as the English language has become the universal language of international communication, they say, the American business language and business practices based on private enterprise, pragmatism and a special kind of anti-statism should serve as a "bridge" in transoceanic communication.

A certain "Westernization" of Japan (in Japan's acceptance of U.S. business practices, of some of the "ethics" of American business and of the mass culture aimed at young people) opens up prospects for implanting some pro-American ideological stereotypes in the "Pacific community" that are expected to unite the peoples of the region under the U.S. "information aegis."

This kind of reasoning is at the basis of an intensifying American propaganda infiltration of the region, which is aimed at introducing antisocialist and anticommunist stereotypes and principles into the mass consciousness.

The predominance of the American mass media and their technical means of information transmission and processing (including computer technology and the American "data banks") serves as the basis for this infiltration. Suffice it to say that two-thirds of all the news reports disseminated in the non-socialist world flow through the channels of U.S. news agencies.

Satellites transmitting programs directly to private television sets will become a reality in the very near future. Broadcasts of this kind will "take little heed of existing markets, national borders, copyrights and the established political structures and power networks of broadcasting.... They will have long-range effects both in the social sphere and in the sphere of international politics, paving the way--at least in the technical sense--for an exchange of values, information and propaganda of unparalleled effectiveness."¹⁹ It is no secret that the United States has already been experimenting with this kind of broadcasting in Asian countries for a long time (though still under the control of the national governments concerned) on the basis of the widespread knowledge of the English language in several of these countries.

The plans for perfecting the technical basis of the Voice of America provide for the construction of a powerful (2,500-kilowatt) transmitter on the west coast of the United States. Washington assumes that the United States' absolute superiority in the field of technical communications, and especially space-based means of communication, will help it to establish itself on a colossal scale in the information markets of the Pacific basin, if not to also create a special trans-Pacific communications network. This information imperialism of the United States, as it is called in developing countries, is expected to ensure and consolidate the formation of a new geopolitical reality

in the Asian and Pacific region which would correspond to long-term U.S. goals and interests.

U.S. Policy and Prospects for Keeping Peace in the Region

Despite the aforementioned aims of the current American leadership, possibilities for a more constructive development of events in the Pacific basin have certainly not disappeared. A careful and unbiased consideration of the situation in the region shows that important factors exist which make the transformation of the Pacific Ocean into an ocean of peace, not only in name but also in fact, a realistic possibility.

Sri K. Subrahmanyam, director of the Indian Defense Research and Analysis Institute, views Washington's contemporary approach to the "Third World" as the hope of preserving it as a special kind of ghetto. "The ghetto of the developing world," he wrote, "must be supervised by police forces represented by the rapid deployment force, and all of those in the ghetto...must not occupy themselves with anything but what has been destined for them. Therefore, they must be content with the extractive industries, low-value consumer goods, industries with a high degree of environmental pollution and obsolete technology."²⁰

This line of reasoning is more and more apt to come into conflict with the hard facts, and this will eventually force Washington to pursue a more realistic policy in the region. Most of the developing countries do not now see a threat to their security in the policy of the Soviet Union, but in the expansionist aspirations of the United States and some of its allies. They consider the constant presence of large U.S. naval forces off their coasts to be the contemporary equivalent of the colonizers' armies. The growing military potential of China and Japan, the exaggerated emphasis on "autonomous defense" by Japanese ruling circles, reminding the countries of the region of Japan's ambitions on the eve of World War II, and China's territorial claims against its neighbors--these are real facts, and not propaganda abstractions. And none of the Pentagon and State Department tricks aimed directly at turning public opinion in Asia against the "Soviet threat" have produced the desired effect.²¹

Moreover, we can confidently predict that the more the United States pressures the leading Asian states to oppose the Soviet Union, the more energetically these states will resist this pressure precisely for the sake of preserving the balance of power. The governments of many states in the Pacific believe that what is required to ensure stability in the region and to solve the existing international conflicts is the Soviet Union's active participation in the entire process.

The United States is not omnipotent in that part of the world, despite all of its imperial pretensions and its present rejoicing over some unusual successes of its policy there. Regional policy is shaped and will continue to be shaped to a greater and greater degree by the collective efforts of all states of the "Pacific club." Therefore, the long-term and predominant policy trends will depend on the foreign policy activities most characteristic of the

Pacific Asian states. These activities are primarily the ones that promote their independent socioeconomic development and the preservation of peace in Asia--not an American, Chinese or Japanese peace, but a peace without national coloring, peace and security for all.

This kind of peace can only be ensured by long-term cooperation in reducing the danger of nuclear war, the demilitarization of policy and united efforts to solve mankind's common problems. This presupposes the preservation of the Pacific Ocean as a unique ecological system providing the living conditions and resources for the existence of the half of the human race concentrated in this basin.

The level of the organic economic and ecological interdependence of the Pacific countries is already quite high and will continue to rise as a result of the natural expansion of the range of mutual interests. These real processes promote the intensive consolidation of economic activities on the basis of the efficient division of labor and the exploitation of the natural resources and industrial achievements of each of the countries involved, in order to accelerate regional development in the interests of the growing population.

It is a well-known fact that the ASEAN countries, China's coastal regions, the Soviet Far East, Canada's Pacific coast and the northwestern parts of the United States are the regions of the basin with the greatest current potential for dynamic economic and technological development.

The completion of the construction of the Baykal-Amur trunk line and of large ports on the Pacific coast of the USSR and the beginning of the construction of a new railroad to Yakutsk provide strong momentum for the accelerated development of productive forces in Siberia and the Far East and open up opportunities for the exploitation of their substantial natural resources, not only by the USSR but also--on the basis of the regional division of labor--other countries of the Pacific basin. "As far as East Siberia is concerned, the analysis of the strategic, economic and political significance of its development on the local, regional and global levels indicates little risk and a substantial gain for the interests of the United States and its ally, Japan, in the accelerated development of its resources. This is especially true if we contrast long-term considerations to short-term ones,"²² wrote A. Whiting, prominent American expert on Asian affairs, in his study of the potential consequences of the development of Siberia.

These possibilities and the prospect of fruitful cooperation between countries, regardless of their socioeconomic systems, are acknowledged in Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia and other countries of the region.

Increasingly broad segments of the American public also realize the hopelessness of the policy of confrontation. The mandate given to Reagan in the 1984 elections can be interpreted in various ways. But one thing is perfectly clear: It cannot be viewed as a mandate for the escalation of tension in Soviet-American relations. On the contrary, voters unequivocally demanded

that the country's leadership liquidate that tension, put an end to the outright belligerence in relations with Moscow and reach an agreement on steps to prevent the threat of nuclear war and to end the arms race. In order to fulfill this obviously categorical demand of the voters, Reagan's second-term administration has moved toward new negotiations with the USSR on nuclear and space weapons.

In recent years, questions of cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region have been discussed more than once at Soviet-American and Soviet-Japanese public and academic conferences. These discussions show that there are extensive possibilities for the expansion of trade through the more intensive export specialization of states, the development of new forms of international division of labor and the organization of multilateral cooperative production. Of course, these possibilities can only be realized under the conditions of the demilitarization of foreign policy and, in particular, the limitation and reduction of the naval activities of the great powers in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and under the conditions of the elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures to reduce tension and resolve existing conflicts in Asia on the basis of the principles of self-determination, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The proposals incorporated in the final declaration of the seventh conference of the heads of state and government of nonaligned countries, which are aimed at strengthening peace in the Pacific and Indian oceans, are of exceptionally great importance.

"We are convinced that Asia can and must become a continent of peace and good-neighboringness," M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, pointed out. "Only under the conditions of real peace and stability can the countries of the region successfully accomplish the difficult tasks of socioeconomic development they are now facing."²³

This is also the aim of the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including the proposals on confidence-building measures in the Far East, on a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in the relations between Asian and Pacific states and on an all-Asian forum for the discussion and consideration of constructive ways of transforming that region into a zone of peace and equitable cooperation.

FOOTNOTES

1. In this connection, the EEC cannot be compared to the aforementioned four countries because it is still only a customs union of independent states.
2. J. Naisbitt, "Megatrends. Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives," N.Y., 1982, p 221.
3. "R.N. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon," N.Y., 1978, p 352.
4. A. Haig, Jr., "Caveat. Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy," N.Y., 1984, p 21.

5. Quoted in: J. Naisbitt, *Op. cit.*, p 220.
6. For more detail, see A. B. Parkanskiy, "The Pacific States: Trends in Foreign Trade and Economic Development," *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA*, 1983, No 6, pp 60-70.
7. R. Randolph, "Pacific Overtures," *FOREIGN POLICY*, No 57, Winter 1984/85, p 134.
8. B. Nussbaum, "The World After Oil: The Shifting Axis of Power and Wealth," *N.Y.*, 1983, p 285.
9. See, for example, J. Stavridis, "U.S. Navy, Naval Strategy and National Ocean Policy," *U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS*, July 1984, pp 43-47.
10. Quoted in: J. Knauss, "Marine Policy for the 1980's and Beyond," *OCEANUS*, Winter 1982/83, p 3.
11. *THE LOS ANGELES TIMES*, 24 April 1983.
12. The Ohio class missile-carrying submarines of this system have a displacement tonnage of 18,700 tons and carry 24 Trident-I missiles, each equipped with 8 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. The power of each warhead is 100 kilotons and the range of the missile is 7,400 kilometers. The United States intends to deploy the first seven submarines of the Trident system by 1987. In 1989 the submarines will begin to be equipped with the new Trident-II submarine-launched ballistic missiles with maneuverable targetable warheads. The Trident-II missile is capable of carrying up to 15 nuclear warheads. According to the U.S. secretary of defense, the "Trident-II missile will almost double the capability of each Trident-type submarine" (quoted in: "Nuclear Weapons Databook," vol 1, "U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities," Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, p 144).
13. The first carrier of these missiles (with a range of 2,500 kilometers and a force of 200 kilotons) is the battleship "New Jersey," which has been specially re-equipped for the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
14. "United States-Japan Relations," Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Wash., 1984, p 423.
15. *Ibid.*, p 429.
16. R. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1967, pp 112-124.
17. It is interesting that when Nixon set forth his plan for the "Pacific community" in 1967, he viewed it as something like an Asian NATO directed against the PRC, as a "counterbalance to Chinese plans" (R. Nixon, *Op. cit.*, p 124).

18. H. Kahn, "The Historical and World Context of East Asian Development," in "Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition," edited by R. Solomon, 1979, pp 198-199.
19. D. Webster, "Direct Broadcast Satellites: Proximity, Sovereignty and National Identity," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1984, pp 1161-1162.
20. "The Second Cold War," edited by K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, 1983, p 181.
21. This is discussed in Hironobu Ishikawa's article, "Security in East Asia and the Pacific Basin" (ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY, Winter 1984, No 23, pp 1-10).
22. A. Whiting, "Siberian Development and East Asia. Threat or Promise?" Stanford (Calif.), 1981, p 236.
23. PRAVDA, 29 June 1985.

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U.S. ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE BACK FOREIGN COMPETITORS HIT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 85 (signed to press 18 Sep 85) pp 15-25

[Article by R. I. Zimenkov and A. B. Parkanskiy: "An Attempt To Oust Competitors"]

[Text] The foreign and domestic policy of the United States is depending more and more on international economic relations. The American economy's interaction with the world economy was stimulated considerably by the intense development of the global complexes of transnational corporations. At the end of the 1970's the United States launched an offensive against Western Europe and Japan for the purpose of driving its main competitors out of some areas of rivalry.

The Increasing Importance of Foreign Economic Relations in the U.S. Economy

The increased involvement of the American economy in international division of labor was reflected in the rapid growth of the absolute volume of U.S. foreign trade. Between 1970 and 1984 U.S. exports increased 5-fold and reached 217.9 billion dollars; imports increased almost 8.2-fold and totaled 341 billion dollars. Growth rates of foreign trade steadily surpassed the average rates of economic development (only the crisis of 1980-1982 broke this trend). As a result, the proportion accounted for by exports in the U.S. gross national product increased from less than 4.3 percent in 1970 to almost 6.1 percent in 1983, and the figure for imports rose from 4 percent to 7.8 percent. Foreign trade played an even more important role in physical production: In 1983 exports accounted for more than 15.5 percent of all U.S. commercial production and over 19.1 percent of total commodity purchases.¹

The American economy is growing more dependent on shipments of crude energy resources. The United States now accounts for over 30 percent of world consumption. It not only imports around 33 percent of the oil it needs but is also dependent on imports to satisfy more than 50 percent of its need for 24 of the 37 other most important minerals. According to forecasts, by 2000 it will be unable to satisfy its domestic demand for any type of crude resource, and imports of crude resources are expected to account for up to 30-50 percent of all domestic consumption. It should be borne in mind, however, that the increasing dependence on foreign resources is due more to socioeconomic factors

than to natural and geological ones, especially the efforts of corporations and the bourgeois state to use many cheaper imported resources rather than to encourage their domestic production. As a result, the U.S. share of the world output of crude resources decreased from 40 percent in 1940 to 24 percent in 1982.

Table 1. U.S. Assets Abroad and Foreign Assets in the United States, in Billions of Dollars

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
Total U.S. assets abroad	85.6	120.4	165.9	295.1	606.9	719.6	838.1	887.5
Official reserves	19.4	15.6	14.5	16.2	26.8	30.1	34.0	33.8
Gold	17.8	13.8	11.1	11.6	11.2	11.2	11.1	11.1
SDR	--	--	0.8	2.3	2.6	4.1	5.3	5.0
IMF reserve position	1.6	0.9	1.9	2.2	2.9	5.1	7.3	11.3
Foreign currency	--	0.8	0.6	0.1	10.1	9.8	10.2	6.3
Other government assets (excluding reserves)	16.9	23.4	32.2	41.8	63.6	68.5	74.4	79.3
Short-term	2.9	3.2	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.7
Private assets	49.3	82.5	118.8	237.1	516.6	621.1	729.8	774.4
Direct investments	31.9	49.5	75.5	124.1	215.4	228.4	221.5	226.2
Securities, etc.	12.2	20.1	29.4	53.2	97.3	99.2	103.7	118.3
Bank	5.3	13.8	13.7	59.8	203.9	293.5	404.6	430.0
Foreign assets in United States, total	40.9	58.8	106.9	220.9	500.8	576.5	688.6	781.5
Foreign official assets in United States	11.9	16.7	26.1	86.9	176.1	180.5	189.1	193.9
Other (private) foreign assets in United States	28.9	42.1	80.8	133.9	324.7	396.0	499.6	587.6
Direct investments	6.9	8.8	13.3	27.7	83.0	106.2	121.9	133.5
Securities, etc.	11.6	17.1	44.9	63.7	120.6	124.4	146.8	173.8
Indebtedness to private holders of dollars	9.1	12.9	22.7	42.5	121.1	165.4	231.3	280.3
Net assets	44.7	61.6	58.5	74.2	106.1	143.1	149.5	106.0

Compiled according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1984, p 40.

The intensity of the international movement of capital has been heightened in the 1980's. The United States has colossal overseas assets, which have increased more than 10-fold in the last quarter of a century and totaled 887.5 billion dollars at the beginning of 1984. Foreign assets in the United States displayed an even greater increase during the same period--19-fold, totaling 781.5 billion dollars (see Table 1). Most of the new foreign investments (82.9 percent in 1983) are short- and medium-term investments outside the production sphere.

The rapid increase in foreign capital investments, due largely to the high interest rates on loans in the 1980's, turned the United States into a net-importer for the first time in many years at the beginning of the decade, and

not only in short-term but also in long-term capital. As a result, its net assets (assets exceeding liabilities) decreased from 143.1 billion dollars in 1981 to 106 billion in 1983.²

Foreign investors are striving to combine their technological and production achievements in several fields with the advantages of the American market, the largest in the capitalist world, a market in which highly skilled manpower, strong industrial potential and rich natural resources are concentrated.³ The West European and Japanese companies representing the main investors in the American economy view the United States as a "reliable haven," where they are insured against nationalization and expropriation. They also hope to bypass the protectionist barriers the United States has erected to block some commodities and to gain an opportunity to react more quickly and effectively to changes in demand in the American market. The hope of gaining access to technological and administrative achievements through direct investments is another important motive.

Direct foreign private capital investments in the United States were close to 133.5 billion dollars in 1983, an increase of almost fivefold in comparison to 1975 (see Table 1).

This trend attests to the relatively stronger position of West European and Japanese capital. It is also significant, however, that the increase in foreign investments in the late 1970's and the first half of the 1980's was due largely to the relatively better economic conditions in the United States.

There are substantial differences between patterns of American investments abroad and foreign investments in the United States. For example, whereas direct investments account for over 30 percent of all American private capital investments abroad, the indicator is much lower for foreign investments in the United States--around 19 percent.

The American transnational corporations (TNC's) have created global production complexes outside the United States. Over a period of 5 years (1979-1983), their overseas direct capital investments rose from 187.9 billion dollars to 226.2 billion, and the proportion accounted for by overseas sales in the total sales volume of these corporations rose from 23 percent in 1971 to 31 percent by 1980.⁴ According to the latest data, the sales of overseas branches, affiliates and other firms controlled by American capital were more than five times as great as commercial exports from the United States in 1977.

Direct U.S. private capital investments abroad are indissolubly connected with the activities of American corporations in the sphere of international technology transfer. In general, the United States still leads the capitalist world in scientific and technical development, and it has managed to do this by making efficient use of its latest technology and profitably "sharing" comparatively obsolete achievements, knowledge and experience with its partner-rivals.

The trade in technological and administrative expertise is a rapidly expanding form of U.S. foreign economic contacts. This can be judged from the fact that

American TNC's control 60-70 percent of the value of all commercial exchanges of the results of R & D projects in the capitalist world. The total value of U.S. exchanges reached 8.3 billion dollars in 1983, an almost fourfold increase over the figure for the early 1970's. Furthermore, the receipts of American corporations exceeded 7.85 billion dollars, while their payments amounted to only 452 million. The United States has maintained a positive balance in technology trade with its leading imperialist rivals: In 1983 the balance was 695 million dollars in trade with Japan and 3.119 billion in trade with the EEC countries, including 648 million with the FRG, 766 million with Great Britain and 338 million with France.

The trade in services has played a much more important role in U.S. foreign economic relations in recent years. Exports reached 142.4 billion dollars in 1984, as compared to 92.5 billion in 1977.⁵ Approximately the same number of Americans are engaged in serving the U.S. industrial export sector as in the production of export goods. In the 1970's income from the export of services rose at an average rate of 19 percent a year, or double the rate of the 1960's. In 1984 the trade in services increased the income portion of the American balance of payments by 17.6 billion dollars, and the trade in goods increased the expenditure portion of this balance by 123.3 billion dollars.

Table 2. Growth of GNP of Developed Capitalist Countries, %

Countries	1974-						1982 GNP	
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	\$ bil.	%
OECD countries	2.7	1.2	2.0	-0.5	2.3	--	7246.9	100.0
United States	2.6	-0.3	2.5	-2.1	3.7	6.8	3109.6	42.8
Japan	3.6	4.9	4.0	3.2	3.0	5.8	1060.0	14.6
EEC	2.4	1.1	-0.3	0.5	0.8	2.3	2318.8	31.9
FRG	2.4	1.8	-0.1	-1.0	1.3	2.5	658.8	9.1
France	3.1	1.1	0.3	1.6	0.5	1.8	540.1	7.5
Great Britain	1.4	-2.6	-1.3	2.3	2.5	2.0	480.5	6.6

Calculated according to: "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics World Economic Survey 1984," Wash., 1984, p 75; "Economic Report of the President, February 1985," Wash., 1985, p 356.

Therefore, the increasing importance of foreign economic contacts to the United States is a complex and contradictory process. Although the process is expanding the sphere of activities of American corporations and giving them a chance to make extensive use of the advantages of international division of labor in their own interest, it is also making the American economy more dependent on the world market.

Trends in Inter-Imperialist Competition

The combination of the unequal economic growth of capitalist states and the tendency toward the equalization of their levels of development has had significant but contradictory effects on the competition between the United States

and other centers of imperialism. We will analyze the dynamics of basic indicators to determine their positions in the world economy.

There were some changes in the general patterns of the competition of the three centers of imperialism during the crisis years (1980-1982) and the post-crisis period (see Table 2). The revival of economic activity was a much quicker process in the United States.

The absolute value of the American GNP also increased--approximately 1.5-fold between 1978 and 1982, reaching 3,109,600,000 dollars. During the same years, its share of the OECD total rose from 34.7 to 42.8 percent, considerably surpassing the indicator for the Common Market countries and Japan.

Between 1974 and 1979 the United States surpassed all of the developed capitalist countries in terms of the growth rate of industrial production. Under the influence of the 1980-1982 crisis, the rate declined, just as it did in the other capitalist states. Later, however, it far surpassed the indicator for many rival countries. As a result, the U.S. share of capitalist industrial production rose from 35.7 percent in 1970 to 36.7 percent in 1983, while the share of the EEC countries declined from 38 to 34.7 percent, and Japan's share rose from 13.3 to 15.6 percent.

Although Japan, the FRG and other West European countries have narrowed the gap between their levels of labor productivity and the U.S. level in the last decade and a half, the United States is still ahead of its rivals. In the first half of the 1980's the growth rate of labor productivity in the American processing industry rose slightly. The United States is ahead of many EEC countries, including the FRG and Great Britain, in terms of this indicator, and in 1983 it passed up Japan.⁶

There have been important trends in scientific and technical cooperation in the 1980's. Since the end of the 1970's there has been a significant increase in R & D expenditures in the American economy. According to estimates, they exceeded 97 billion dollars in 1983 and represented around 50 percent of the total R & D expenditures of the leading OECD countries. The proportion accounted for by these expenditures in the U.S. GNP increased, reaching 2.7 percent in 1983. In the FRG the indicator is close to the American figure, and in Japan it was 2.4 percent in 1981.⁷ In the 1980's, despite a definite reduction of the gap between the levels of scientific and technical development of the three centers, the United States has remained the leader in terms of such important indicators of scientific and technical progress as the number of innovations and the number of scientists and engineers per 10,000 workers. It has a colossal balance in the trade in new and state-of-the-art equipment and technology. The strongest scientific and technical potential in the capitalist world is still the main factor determining the United States' advantage over its rivals.

There have been contradictory trends in the balance of power in international trade. Throughout the 1960's and most of the 1970's, the position of the United States in world trade was comparatively weaker, Japan's was stronger, and that of the EEC countries remained the same or grew somewhat weaker. This is attested to specifically by the dynamics of the rivals' shares of world

capitalist exports and exports of manufactured goods (see Table 3). In the late 1970's and early 1980's the United States was able to stabilize its position in foreign trade and even to strengthen it to some extent, particularly in relation to Western Europe. The U.S. share of exports in the non-socialist world was 12.4 percent in 1983, and its share of the total exports of finished manufactured goods of the 15 largest capitalist states rose to 19.4 percent.⁸ The proportion accounted for by science-intensive products in U.S. industrial exports is still the highest in the capitalist world (around 50 percent), surpassing the indicators for the FRG (38 percent) and Japan (42 percent).⁹ The United States is still the leader in the world markets of the most important categories of manufactured goods (computers of various categories, the products of the chemical and aerospace industries, military equipment and materiel). The United States is also the main exporter of agricultural products, and it is using this position to exert pressure for political and economic purposes both on some developed capitalist states (Japan, for example) and on developing countries.

Table 3. Various Countries' Shares of Capitalist Exports in 1970-83, %

Countries	Total capitalist exports				Total manufactured goods			
	1970	1975	1980	1983	1970	1975	1980	1983
United States	15.4	13.6	12.1	12.4	21.3	19.1	18.3	19.4
Japan	6.9	7.1	7.1	9.1	8.9	11.4	11.9	14.8
France	6.4	6.7	6.3	5.9	9.1	10.2	10.2	9.3
FRG	12.1	11.4	10.5	10.5	19.8	10.1	19.8	19.7
Great Britain	7.0	5.6	6.0	5.7	10.4	8.9	10.0	7.8

Calculated according to: CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, July 1981; November 1984.

Several trends which could be called negative for the United States have also continued. Imports of goods have increased more quickly than exports in recent years, resulting in a deficit of 57.6 billion dollars in 1983. In 1984 the deficit will total 123.3 billion. In 1983 imports exceeded exports of finished manufactured goods by 31 billion dollars, and the gap widened in 1984.¹⁰

It should be borne in mind, however, that the fact that the United States was the first of the developed capitalist countries to emerge from the crisis played a definite role in the sharp increase in imports in 1983 and 1984 and the deterioration of the American balance of trade. This led to a rapid rise in the demand for imported goods at a time of relatively limited foreign demand for American goods. The West European countries and Japan could increase their imports, including those from the United States, considerably during a period of more active economic growth. In view of the fact that the world demand for American agricultural goods is expected to rise in the foreseeable future (although more slowly than in the 1970's), the possibility of a significant increase in exports of these goods during the second half of the 1980's cannot be excluded. A possible decline in the exchange rate of the

dollar could stimulate American exports and restrict imports, particularly imports of finished goods.

The declining energy requirements of the American economy in the last decade obviously exclude the possibility of a new abrupt increase in oil imports comparable to that of the 1970's. In addition, the United States is trying to diversify sources of imported oil, primarily to reduce its dependence on the OPEC countries. In general, it has been more successful than its imperialist rivals in adapting to the new energy situation. In view of these trends, the general conditions of American foreign trade could be relatively favorable in the future.

There were definite changes in the international movement of capital in the second half of the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's. During the 1973-1981 period, the U.S. share of the overseas direct capital investments of the leading capitalist states increased while the share of Western Europe and Japan decreased.¹¹ In addition, in the export of capital the United States is occupying a stronger position than its rivals. It is still the main exporter of capital to the developed and developing countries. This is apparent just from the fact that the total direct capital investments taken out of the United States each year are 4-6 times as great as the capital exported by its chief rivals in this field, Great Britain, the FRG and Japan. Between 1977 and 1980 the overseas sales of U.S. TNC's increased more than 5.6-fold, according to the estimates of UN experts, while total sales increased 3.5-fold during this period. If the sales volume of American TNC's abroad represents 100 percent, the sales of the TNC's of Great Britain were equivalent to 29 percent in 1980, with respective figures of 26 percent for the FRG, 16 percent for France, 8 percent for Japan and so forth. In other words, the overseas sales of U.S. TNC's exceed the sales of all of their main imperialist rivals combined.¹²

Most of the American direct capital investments abroad (73.7 percent in 1983) went to developed capitalist states; 24 percent of the capital was invested in developing countries. In Western Europe, which accounts for 60.4 percent of all direct U.S. investments in the developed capitalist countries, most of the American investments are concentrated in the processing industry--42.3 percent in 1983. In recent years there has been a relative decrease in the proportional share of these sectors in connection with investments in the oil industry: They accounted for 24 percent in 1983. It is important that American investments are concentrated primarily in the leading science-intensive sectors. West European investments in the United States are not as great as American investments in Western Europe, and they are primarily in the sphere of trade and insurance.

American investment positions are also stronger in the developing countries, where American companies account for 44.2 percent of all TNC affiliates. Furthermore, the capital of U.S. corporations is concentrated to a greater degree in the processing industries.

The U.S. position in the capitalist monetary system grew much stronger in the first half of the 1980's. More overt pressure on allies, with no consideration

for their interests, became a part of U.S. currency policy. This applies above all to Washington's policy of "expensive credit"--the artificially inflated interest rates on loans, which have been extremely injurious to the economies of other capitalist countries. At the same time, the United States covered around 40 percent of the federal budget deficit in 1983 with new foreign private investments. The flow of capital out of Western Europe amounted to 170 billion dollars just between January 1980 and June 1984, and this seriously inhibited the economic growth of these countries.

The "interest war" started by the United States was supplemented by the so-called policy of minimum intervention in the functioning of international currency markets, which led to an abrupt rise in the exchange rate of the dollar. The American administration's action also had a destabilizing effect on the economies and foreign trade of other capitalist states. In particular, the higher exchange rate of the dollar raised the cost of imported goods for many developed capitalist states, especially in the case of the oil imported by countries paying for it in dollars.

Developing countries are also feeling the negative effects of U.S. currency policy. By the end of 1984 their foreign debt, excluding short-term obligations, exceeded 637 billion dollars.¹³ A rise of just 1 percent in interest rates signifies additional payments of 3-4 billion dollars for the emerging states.

Therefore, important changes are taking place in the competition between the United States and its imperialist rivals in the 1980's. Some reflect the reinforcement of U.S. positions, although they are of a somewhat transitional nature, while others reflect a decline of influence. American ruling circles want to use their remaining economic, financial, scientific and technical strength, ensuring them a significant advantage over their rivals, to reinforce and stabilize favorable trends.

Government Support

The more active state-monopolist stimulation of U.S. foreign economic expansion by federal and local government agencies occupies an important place among the present conditions of inter-imperialist rivalry.

The main instrument with which the United States hopes to drive back its competitors is the augmentation of the competitive potential of its equipment and technology in international markets. The American economy is now undergoing a process of structural reorganization,¹⁴ during the course of which the new science-intensive industries are developing at the quickest rate--electronics, telecommunications, the semiconductor, aerospace and chemical industries, scientific instrument building, genetic engineering, the production of new materials, robot engineering and others. In 1981-1983 the U.S. index of industrial production decreased by 1.5 percent, while the index of production in science-intensive sectors increased by 1 percent.

The proportion accounted for by science-intensive sectors in total U.S. industrial production has displayed a long-range tendency toward increase.

According to forecasts, it will increase from 27.6 percent in 1970 to 33-34 percent in 1995, including an increase from 29.8 to 33-34 percent between 1980 and 1995. The proportion accounted for by these sectors in the total number of people employed in industry as a whole will increase from 21.5 to 29-30 percent and from 25 to 29-30 percent during these same periods.¹⁵ As the book "High Technology: Public Policies for the 80's" notes, the current reorganization of American industry, however painful, is the only way of retaining U.S. influence in today's world and should be stimulated even more by state-monopolist methods of regulation.¹⁶

Antitrust legislation began to occupy an important place in the reorganization in the 1980's.¹⁷ Reagan Administration policy in this area has consistently had the aim of strengthening U.S. big capital's international competitive position within the country and abroad.

First of all, the process of mergers and takeovers was intensified with the tacit approval of the government.¹⁸ The lifting of legislative restrictions impeding higher concentration and monopolization in R & D and in export-import operations is an important part of the system of measures to strengthen U.S. positions in the world economy. At the same time, American monopolies are demanding the exclusion of the possibility of the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. In other words, they want any of their operations in foreign markets which fall under the provisions of this legislation to be judged according to local--and usually more liberal--laws.¹⁹

An important lever the Reagan Administration hopes to use to channel the development of international economic relations in a direction convenient for the United States is the export of private capital. Under the Reagan Administration, just as before, an important means of encouraging these exports is the long-range program of overseas private capital investments guaranteed and insured by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The corporation's main functions consist in investment guarantees, direct financing, assistance in pre-investment surveys and the distribution of relevant information to investors. Between 1971 and 1981 the corporation insured American investments for 8.5 billion dollars against political risks in 68 developing countries, and its insurance volume in 1981 alone totaled 1.48 billion dollars. This was the highest indicator in all the 11 years of its existence.²⁰

The present machinery of government support for American corporations also includes various tax benefits and the international legal defense of TNC's. In 1980 and 1981 laws were passed in the United States in this connection.

Steps have been taken to conclude bilateral investment agreements similar to those England, the FRG, France and Japan are already using quite extensively in relations with developing countries. These agreements include guarantees and the rules governing the registration of income and the transfer of assets of enterprises controlled by American TNC's, arbitration procedures and provisions for compensation in the event of nationalization. In 1982 agreements of this kind were signed with Egypt, Panama and Costa Rica. In the second half of the 1980's the U.S. administration intends to conclude bilateral investment agreements with around 20 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In the late 1970's and first half of the 1980's priority was assigned to foreign trade, where the position of the United States admittedly grew particularly weak in the 1970's. The main distinctive feature of long-range foreign trade strategy is that it is not only supposed to secure the interests of American exporters and regulate imports, but is also being coordinated more closely with measures to stimulate the structural reorganization of the U.S. economy.

It must be said that the United States, which preaches the principle of "free trade," has been the main initiator of the removal or considerable reduction of the majority of customs barriers in world trade in the postwar decades. At the same time, it has created a powerful state-monopolist mechanism for the direct and indirect regulation of foreign trade, intended to promote the exports of U.S. corporations and defend their interests in competition with imported goods in the American market. The Republican administration, upholding the slogan of "free trade," is striving for the customs disarmament of its trade partners because their protectionist measures are hindering American exports. American trade policy, however, is still based on the increasingly subtle use of protectionist measures, particularly non-tariff ones, to guard the interests of certain American industries against stronger competition from companies in Western Europe, Japan and the new industrial states. The imposition of restrictions on West European and Japanese deliveries of steel and passenger cars to the United States and stricter limits on imports of textile goods has become chronic.

Another characteristic of this U.S. neoprotectionism is the search for common international "rules" of state-monopolist foreign trade regulation. This reflects a forced adaptation to current trends in the world capitalist economy and also a desire to control them in the interests of the United States and keep the increased interdependence of national economies under control. A characteristic example of "controlled" protectionism is the multilateral agreement on textile goods the United States imposed on the main exporters of these products, developing countries in Southeast and East Asia.

In general, however, an analysis of Reagan Administration undertakings in the sphere of foreign trade indicates a definite shift in emphasis from the policy of import restriction (with no reduction, of course, in selective protectionism) to measures to intensify exports. As soon as Reagan took office, his administration took steps to cancel earlier restrictions connected with the observance of antitrust laws, environmental protection, the struggle against bribery in foreign trade contract negotiations, and so forth. The Republicans revised the previous administration's policy on arms sales: American embassies now perform the same commercial services for firms selling arms and military equipment as for firms trading in civilian goods; on the pretext of "substantial progress" in the observation of human rights in Chile, the U.S. Export-Import Bank restriction on credit to the Pinochet regime was canceled at the beginning of 1981; restrictions on exports of goods to the racist regime in South Africa and on export deliveries to the undemocratic regimes in Paraguay, Honduras and El Salvador are being relaxed.

The Export-Import Bank is the traditional channel for the intensification of exports of American goods. In its policy of budget economy, the United States

is reducing the bank's financial powers on the one hand and trying to use it in credit competition with the EEC and Japan on the other. For example, the 3-year program of export credit subsidies adopted in 1982 to support the prices of American agricultural commodities includes the extension of interest-free government credit to their importers. A projected sum of around 1.5 billion dollars is to be spent on this. The Reagan Administration is also making active use of various assistance programs to expand U.S. exports.

The stimulation of exports of services is an important area of administration activity. The assistance of exporters of services is coordinated by the Department of Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the State Department. Besides this, an office in charge of the export of services was created in the Department of Commerce for the official support of American companies whose overseas activities were being complicated by the governments of foreign states. The United States proposed the extension of GATT jurisdiction to the trade in services or the drafting of a corresponding international agreement.

State and local government agencies became much more active in the stimulation of exports of goods and imports of private capital investments in the 1970's and 1980's. By the end of 1984 resolutions had been passed in 14 states on programs to finance exports and create the corresponding institutions; officials in another 12 states are considering the possibility of such resolutions. The main areas of their activity in this sphere consist, firstly, in extending export guarantees and insuring export credit; secondly, in aiding in the attainment of federal export credit; thirdly, in aiding in the financing of the export operations of private firms and government organizations.

Another important area of state government activity is the establishment of overseas representatives to encourage investments of foreign capital in the United States and promote exports. At the end of 1984, 27 American states had 52 of their own representative agencies in 10 countries. Joint organizations are being founded to stimulate export activity. For example, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee and Alabama use the Mid-South Trade Council to advertise products manufactured in these states and to send commercial and industrial delegations abroad.

In general, however, the specific forms of U.S. state-monopolist stimulation of foreign economic expansion do not transcend the bounds of extremely traditional (if not for the United States, then for Japan, France and other countries) measures and can produce results, especially since the more active government support of the foreign economic expansion of American monopolist capital is being supplemented with direct pressure on developed capitalist and developing states to subordinate their economies and foreign relations to American interests.

By escalating political and military tension in the world, U.S. ruling circles are violating negotiated agreements, attempting to organize a commercial, credit and technological blockade of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community and are using various methods of pressure, embargos and "sanctions" against them and some developing states. Washington is also

trying to impose the same line on its imperialist allies. The United States wants to undermine the positions of countries and firms maintaining economic contact with socialist states. This is also the purpose of the policy of forcing massive rearmament programs and military spending increases on the developed capitalist and developing countries. The increase in these expenditures in the NATO countries (excluding the United States) in current prices just during the years of the economic crisis (1980-1982) was 26.5 percent. In 1983 they rose another 11.2 percent, reaching 159 billion dollars. The long-range military programs recently adopted in England, France and other NATO countries will lead to the continuous growth of these expenditures throughout the current decade. Under U.S. pressure, Japan has also begun to increase military spending dramatically. The increase was 27.5 percent between 1980 and 1983. The expenditures of developing countries were 33 billion dollars in 1972, or 7.9 percent of world military spending (in 1979 prices), but by 1982 they exceeded 81 billion dollars, or 15.6 percent.

By involving its partners in the arms race, the United States is also earning huge profits from the growth of arms exports. The value of military equipment and hardware delivered to foreign states in accordance with intergovernmental agreements increased by 8.5 billion dollars between 1979 and 1982 and totaled 21.5 billion dollars.

Therefore, the United States has launched a broad-scale economic offensive against the main centers of contemporary imperialism, against other capitalist states. This has become the most important aspect of its current strategy of ousting and debilitating competitors and of solving its own domestic problems at the expense of rivals.

FOOTNOTES

1. Calculated according to: "The United States in a Changing World Economy: The Case for an Integrated Domestic and International Commercial Policy," Wash., 1983, p 9; BUSINESS AMERICA, 20 February 1984, p 3; FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, April 1984, pp A51, A48.
2. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1984, p 40.
3. For more detail, see "SShA: vnesheekonomiceskaya strategiya" [U.S. Foreign Economic Strategy], Moscow, 1976, p 411.
4. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1984, p 27.
5. NATION'S BUSINESS, January 1982, pp 42-44; BUSINESS AMERICA, 4 March 1985, p 7.
6. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, August 1984.
7. "Science Indicators 1982," Wash., 1983, pp 2, 7.
8. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, August 1984.

9. MEMO, 1984, No 1, p 47.
10. BUSINESS AMERICA, 20 February 1984, p 24; 6 February 1984, p 12.
11. MEMO, 1984, No 1, p 46.
12. Calculated according to "Transnational Corporations in World Development. Third Survey," N.Y., 1983, p 366.
13. Doc UNCTAD/TDR/3/Rev. 1, June 1984, p 30.
14. For more detail, see N. V. Volkov, "The Specific Phases of the Structural Reorganization of the American Economy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 9.
15. BIKI, 1984, No 129, p 2.
16. "High Technology: Public Policies for the 80's," N.Y., 1983.
17. For more detail, see G. I. Nikerov, "Changes in Antitrust Regulation," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 8.
18. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, December 1982, p 502; VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Summer 1982, pp 715-776; INDUSTRY WEEK, 27 January 1983, pp 74-79.
19. "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. U.S. House of Representatives," Wash., 1983.
20. "Transnational Corporations in World Development. Third Survey," p 96.

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THE U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 85 (signed to press 18 Sep 85) pp 26-36

[Article by N. P. Popov]

[Text] The process by which a policy line is mapped out and specific decisions are made in the area of Soviet-American relations in the United States is influenced directly by certain segments of the ruling elite and is also influenced, and sometimes to a considerable extent, by the overall psychological climate in the country. In particular, opinions on the issues of war and peace and on Soviet-American relations depend to a considerable extent on several long-lived psychological factors and on the mass views and feelings they engender.

These feelings are not necessarily overt; they are often unconscious, and it is not always easy to discover their source. However dependent these feelings might be on specific economic and political events, on the rhetoric of leaders and on propaganda in the mass media, once they have become established they have a considerable effect on the political thinking of national leaders responsible for making foreign policy decisions. Mass views on these issues are not a simple reflection of external influences; they obviously take shape according to their own internal laws as well. The feelings of voters, particularly on foreign policy issues, must be taken into account by all political leaders.

In any case, it would be impossible to explain the contradictions and fluctuations in the political views of broad segments of the American population on the issues of war and peace and Soviet-American relations in the postwar period, and especially in the 1970's and 1980's, without taking the psychological processes in the mass mind into account. These included the alternation, and sometimes the combination, of criticism of the Vietnam venture, the growth of antiwar feelings, the desire for arms limitation agreements with the USSR and the simultaneous mistrust of the Soviet Union, hostility toward it and support for Washington's militarist actions and plans to "rearm America." Furthermore, the views of Americans and their emotional approaches to other countries and peoples and to problems in international relations are less the product of actual knowledge and personal experience than of unconscious or latent prejudices, suspicions and fears and the common stereotypes and symbols of the mass mentality and the "mass culture."

The mass media, especially television, play a special role in creating and popularizing the symbols, prejudices and stereotypes. Of course, they have a strong effect on the psychological climate in the country, particularly with regard to foreign policy issues. The patriarch of public opinion studies in the United States, the late G. Gallup, made the unequivocal statement that "American ideas about the Soviet Union depend almost completely on reports in the press and on the published statements of American political leaders. In a certain sense, American views on this matter are the product of the process of communication."¹ American television, with its strong emotional impact, its set of images (or stereotypes) of other countries and peoples and its stereotypical assessments of foreign policy events, plays the most important role in the creation of the required mood in millions of viewers. Furthermore, the mass mentality is not only influenced by news programs on foreign policy issues. Entertainment shows, which take up the major portion of broadcasting time, are full of emotional symbols and political stereotypes. In this context, the media could be described as an "image industry." But even the news media address themselves to certain existing attitudes, striving to manipulate them to form the necessary views on foreign policy issues. These basic attitudes and feelings and the psychological mechanisms giving birth to them will be the subject of this article.

The American mass perception of contemporary world events and issues, including the perception of other countries and peoples, is becoming the object of more and more academic studies and a matter of interest to propagandists and foreign policy strategists. The doctrines they elaborate are often based on the nature of their probable perception. For example, according to the popular "theory of perception," what is important is not merely U.S. military strength and the willingness to use it, but also the impression this strength and the threat of its use make on the rest of the world. Another example is the theory of the U.S. military "lag": According to H. Kissinger, the spread of this impression has serious political consequences because it creates a strong incentive to achieve superiority in arms.

In a discussion of popular beliefs about the Soviet Union in the minds of many American foreign policymakers, famous diplomat and historian G. Kennan used an image from Goethe's "Faust": All of us are eventually at the mercy of the monsters we ourselves have created. He then adds: "This also applies to the image of the USSR employed in American policymaking."²

Another psychological factor must also be borne in mind during the analysis of the process of U.S. foreign policymaking. Unique historical conditions and the influence of specifically American factors gave rise to a political culture in the United States which differs from, for example, the West European culture, and one of its characteristics is the distinctive line of reasoning of upper-echelon leaders. This stratum is distinguished by psychological features linking it with the American broad masses--closer to the "middle class" than to highly educated circles. And the issue here is not the strategic policy line pursued by this ruling elite: Its class goals are obvious. The matter in question here is the elite's characteristic modes of perception, emotional reactions, character traits, manner of judgment and responses; these relate it more closely to the average American--for example, the small businessman or

the skilled mechanic from the heartland--than to government advisers or foreign policy consultants from the academic or military-scientific communities.

This similarity stems partially from the fact that members of the American ruling elite are usually businessmen or lawyers serving the business community rather than members of the hereditary intelligentsia. In this context, the study of the psychological features of the mass mind also provides a key to the thinking of many of the people responsible for making foreign policy decisions.

Obviously, these characteristics are not equally typical of all population strata. Some are more aware and are distinguished by an objective frame of mind while others adhere to reactionary traditions and prejudices. Some features, psychological traits and attitudes are, however, typical of the majority. And some of them are more typical of members of the white "middle class," including the petty bourgeoisie, self-employed individuals and skilled workers. These are precisely the strata constituting the majority of voters in national elections because the less privileged strata no longer believe that a new face in the White House will improve their situation and generally ignore elections. The "middle class" is the repository of conservative views and serves as the mass base for the conservative political groups now in power.

In some cases the study of socioeconomic and political processes requires an analysis of the mentality of various population strata and groups, particularly their views on domestic issues. At the same time, the characteristics of the majority, of "middle America," are important in the disclosure of prevailing attitudes and the psychological climate in the foreign policy sphere.

Imperial Ambitions

The ideas of "divine predestination" and "American exclusivity," imperial attitudes and ambitions, nationalism and chauvinism³ were always widespread in the United States. With the passage of time they only became stronger.

In the 1960's, however, these ambitions were gravely shaken. Americans began to talk about the poverty, hunger (even at times of favorable economic conditions) and racial inequality in their own country. The defeat in Vietnam dealt the most severe blow to the imperial attitudes.

The "superpower's" impotence and inability to win a victory over a small country were painful to bear. This was accompanied by the growing feeling, often vague and submerged, that this was an unjust war and by the collapse of the myth of the United States' "special mission" to set an example for the rest of the world.

The so-called "Vietnam syndrome" consisted primarily of largely unconscious, submerged feelings of frustrated imperial ambitions and "hurt national pride" and a desire for "revenge." For part of the public--and often the same part, because conflicting ideas are often present in the minds of the same people--

the "Vietnam syndrome" also marked the beginning of insight, the understanding that their country was fighting an aggressive war and using barbarous methods. There was a growing aversion to the role of "world policeman."

Conservative and rightwing politicians called for an end to the "Vietnam syndrome," however, as something unpatriotic and un-American. Professor M. McGwire summed up the "post-Vietnam" mood: "Deeply indignant feelings about the Vietnam war--not the feelings of antiwar activists, but the indignation of the silent and confused majority, who remembered the lofty intentions with which it all started and the fiasco with which it ended--partly due to the collapse of the edifice, partly due to the attacks of allies, but mainly because America had not been firm enough."⁴

In our day the old submerged imperial ambitions and nostalgia for "American exclusivity" frequently break through to the surface and are recorded in public opinion polls. This happened during the so-called Iranian crisis and at the time of the invasion of Grenada. At first the public had access to only the official, strictly onesided account of the events on this island, but even half a year later, at the height of the election campaign in May 1984, when more objective reports appeared in the press, most Americans approved of the administration's actions: According to a Harris poll, 61 percent agreed that Reagan's action (the invasion of Grenada) was "successful" and only 29 percent disagreed.⁵

In addition to the current widespread desire for "revenge"⁶ and the nostalgia for the lost "American exclusivity," military superiority and indisputable influence in the world, there is another level of feelings and emotions connected with memories of the war in Vietnam. These feelings, which are characteristic of part of the population, are probably even deeper than the desire to retrieve the losses caused by the defeat. They could be described as the same suppressed "guilt complex" for Vietnam, for the crimes committed there and for the barbarous and senseless nature of this venture. In any case, the talk about compensating Vietnam in some way for its losses quickly died down, and all of the arguments about America's "guilt" and about the entire war in general were quickly "swept under the rug." The present administration has its reasons for its vigorous efforts to vindicate the war and those who fought in it: Monuments are being erected to those who fell in the jungles of Southeast Asia, and so forth.

History has shown, however, that suppressed feelings of guilt and regret for inhuman and amoral behavior have a tendency to find an outlet by being projected at other individuals, entire social groups, nationalities or states, who are accused of similar crimes and amoral actions. In this case, the Soviet Union was chosen as the most convenient target for the projection of the United States' own flaws. As English sociologists D. Leggett and C. Waterlow noted, "apparently, until the Americans surmount the profound horror and suffering of Vietnam, they will need a symbolic enemy--and the Russians are a convenient target."⁷ (It must be said that the Soviet Union became a "symbolic enemy" long before the aggression in Vietnam, as soon as the gun volleys of World War II had subsided.)

In general, in the last decade the American mass mentality has been distinguished by a definitely conservative reaction to the liberal actions of the 1960's and early 1970's, which were painful to some even then and which destroyed the familiar world of established standards, social illusions and stereotypes. This backward swing of the pendulum of public feeling, back to more familiar views and attitudes, has also carried away some of the progressive ideas about foreign policy, ideas which did not have a chance to become firmly established in the public mind during the short period of international detente in the early 1970's.

The nostalgia for "American exclusivity," connected with the loss of this country's earlier superiority in science, technology and the military sphere, was not born today. It was fed by the USSR's decisive successes in World War II, by the development of a nuclear weapon in the Soviet Union, undermining the United States' nuclear monopoly, and by the USSR's launching of the first satellite. All subsequent Soviet successes have been viewed by many in the United States as a challenge to American prestige and as an infringement on its role as the leading world power.

The Soviet Union's achievement of military-strategic parity with the United States is difficult for many Americans to believe and accept. Even when they support sensible arms control proposals, they cannot accept--and this is often unconscious--the very idea of America's equality to any other power in any sphere, especially the military sphere. This is specifically reflected in public opinion polls.

Desirable State of American Nuclear Strength in Comparison to Soviet, %

<u>Responses</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>January 1985</u>
Superior	46	42	51	52	37
Approximately equal	47	45	42	39	50
Not as strong	2	7	2	4	7

CBS NEWS/THE NEW YORK TIMES Polls; latest--7 January 1985.

The popular American expression "second to none" implies supremacy rather than equality. The chauvinistic and anti-Soviet feelings heated up by propaganda media are easy to grow in this soil.

It is probable that similar psychological processes once took place in Spain, Portugal and Great Britain when these countries lost their status as great colonial powers. In fact, the outburst of nationalism in England during the Falkland (Malvinas) crisis was something of a delayed reaction to the loss of imperial privileges and a display of nostalgia for the colonial past of the "mistress of the seas."

Therefore, the American mind in the last two decades has experienced a combination (coinciding in time and in their effects on the national mind) of the

realization of the loss of obvious economic supremacy in the Western world and the loss of military superiority and the experience of the inglorious defeat in Vietnam; the background and the result is the feeling of injured pride due to the loss of the imaginary national exclusivity and superiority and undermined imperial ambitions.

M mentality--Morality--Religion

At the time of its birth the first socialist country presented a "moral challenge" to America, and this was reflected in the American mind. Even many of those who immediately recognized the right of the Soviet republic to exist (especially members of the liberal bourgeoisie and intelligentsia) were displeased by the end of the U.S. monopoly on everything new, progressive, revolutionary and democratic (in their view). After all, many Americans still sincerely believe that the United States is "the birthplace of liberty and democracy," that it is a country where the ideals of equality and of government by the people were realized to perfection, that the country is the "leader of the free world" and so forth.

The very fact of the USSR's existence, its social achievements and the peaceful foreign policy of our country put the idea of the United States' moral superiority and leadership in question. The result was an overt or latent desire to seek out "moral defects" and violations of universally accepted principles in the policy of the USSR, especially its foreign policy, and to ignore these violations in U.S. policy. This is part of the reason for the relatively low level of mass criticism and public indignation in connection with the illegal, adventuristic, covert and overt U.S. operations in violation of international law in Central America, the Middle East and other regions, where these acts are committed on the pretext of defending "American national interests" and "opposing Soviet expansion," as Washington declares (this generally refers to the increasing authority and ideological influence of the USSR).

Religion, especially the characteristic religious practices of Americans, plays a special role in the cultivation of these views and feelings.

Christian dogmata are known to postulate peacemaking, nonviolent resistance to evil, and love for one's neighbor, and to negate and condemn hatred, violence, killing and war. On the other hand, they also underscore the constant struggle of good against evil, and against the bearer of this evil--the Anti-Christ. And when the spirit of evil enters an individual or a group of people, these people are called bearers of evil, and the principle of love for one's neighbor and nonviolence is discarded; the principle of nonviolence applies only to other Christians. The ability to call other people, nationalities or countries heretical, atheistic or unorthodox has always relieved Christians of the need to observe the standards of Christian morality and the biblical commandments in their treatment of these others. Furthermore, the struggle against "evil" and its bearers in human form has been viewed as a noble cause, regardless of the degree of violence used against them. There are many examples of this in history--the Crusades, the Inquisition, the wars between Protestants and Catholics, the colonial conquests, the Africans brought

to the North American colonies to work as slaves, the extermination of the Indians and so forth. All of these were preceded and accompanied by the "dehumanization" of the enemy or the chosen victim. By investing them with the features of the Antichrist or the devil, the aggressive side relieved itself of the burden of morality.

In the United States these old psychological mechanisms have acquired distinctive features. American history gave birth to an integral feature of the national mentality (primarily in the case of Americans from the Anglo-Saxon countries)--individualism, which has often evolved into mass egotism and has frequently been accompanied by violence and the refusal, sometimes unavoidable, to establish and observe legal standards (particularly on the "frontier," in the far west, where there was no official power for a long time).

This free translation of Christian morality, however, was accompanied--as if to compensate for the abovementioned feelings of guilt--by the assignment of greater importance to external displays of religious devotion, frequent church-going and generous donations to the church and the clergy. Another compensating mechanism capable of reducing the psychological discomfort resulting from the departure from moral standards was the aforementioned delegation of amoral and un-Christian qualities to various nationalities and races.

Many Americans are still distinguished by individualism and egotism, an inclination toward "spontaneous" violence and an unprecedented level of ostentatious religious devotion (for example, the maximum level of church attendance in the Western world). Christian moralizing about the "heretical" socialist countries is more prevalent in the official rhetoric and the mass mind in the United States than in other Western countries. The slogans of the "crusade" against the "evil empire"--the Soviet Union--were invented in the United States and were eagerly supported by certain segments of the population.

One aspect of the religious mentality related directly to the interpretation of issues of war and peace is the belief in the inevitable "end of the world," the last decisive battle between good and evil (the biblical Armageddon). For this reason, some churchgoers in the United States (especially Protestant evangelists) have a fatalistic view of the escalation of international tension and the possibility of thermonuclear catastrophe and the "end of the world" predicted in the Bible.⁸ For example, the results of an extensive study of public opinion on questions of war and peace and Soviet-American relations, conducted under the supervision of renowned sociologist D. Yankelovich and R. Kingston, indicated that 39 percent agreed with the statement: "When the Bible predicts that the world will perish by fire, it is saying that nuclear war is inevitable"; 42 percent disagreed and 19 percent were "undecided." (Less than 28 percent of the people with a higher education agreed with this statement, but 49 percent with a "lower than average" income agreed with it.)⁹ Whereas this prospect arouses fear and protest in part of the population, it instills optimism in others because the Apocalypse, in spite of the deaths of many people and the devastation, should lead to the triumph of "good."

This attitude is particularly characteristic of the religious currents and groups influencing the leaders of the current administration. The leader of

the Moral Majority, J. Falwell, has written the following scenario. The Soviets will invade Israel, and communism will be defeated; the Antichrist will appear, and the last gigantic battle will encompass the earth; the universal chaos will end with the defeat of the Antichrist, the second coming of Christ and the beginning of a millenial kingdom of peace and paradise; true believers will be saved from the holocaust and will ascend to heaven.

It is significant that 10-15 million Americans regularly watch the programs of J. Falwell, O. Roberts and other television preachers heralding the imminent, unavoidable and awaited "end of the world," and that the President himself has declared that the "end of the world" will come "during the lifetime of the present generation." This is one of the reasons why, according to the data of one survey conducted in Massachusetts in 1983, 33 percent would prefer a nuclear war in which the population of the United States, its enemies and almost all humanity would die, to living under a "communist regime," viewed by them as the "evil empire."¹⁰

It must be said that the predictions and anticipation of the imminent "end of the world" are not characteristic only of the present nuclear age. They were periodically intensified in the past during devastating wars, epidemics and natural disasters. These feelings can be regarded as something like a psychological protective mechanism diminishing the fear and grief a helpless individual feels when his life is threatened by uncontrollable events.

The intensification of apocalyptic feelings today is not only connected with the mounting danger of nuclear catastrophe but also reflects the Americans' increasing suspicions about the ability of the capitalist system and its social institutions to guarantee steady crisis-free development and freedom from poverty, inequality, ecological problems and alienation in an increasingly complex and hostile world. Evidence of this can be found in the growth of unorthodox religious currents and sects in the United States in recent decades and various forms of escapism.

The main thing is that the belief in the possibility of the imminent "end of the world" does not mean that all of the people who believe this are willing to resign themselves to universal extinction--many are working toward the elimination of the danger of war. Besides this, several religious organizations and religions--the Catholics, for example--reject the apocalyptic ideology and are fighting an increasingly active battle against the threat of war; in particular, many are advocating a freeze on U.S. and USSR nuclear arsenals.

"Necessary" Enemy?

History has proved that a community (from a small group to the population of an entire country) can often be held together by the belief in the inferiority, and sometimes the animosity and hostility, of other groups or of any outside and alien element in general (there is no question that these feelings have frequently been reinforced by invasions by real enemies). Even in the absence of a real external enemy, the mass mentality and mythology often created a symbolic "enemy," which was a uniting, mobilizing factor, and sometimes ascribed some of the community's own negative features to this enemy. Often

the role of the symbolic enemy was played by foreigners, as in medieval Russia; in America the role was played at various times by Catholics (Irish or Polish), Jews, Japanese, Chinese, atheists or communists. "When we have no enemies, we create them," wrote the well-known writer and sociologist S. Keen. "The bonds of tribal unity are maintained by projecting hostile and upsetting emotions at an outsider."¹¹

This is often done by "demonizing" and "dehumanizing" this enemy and spreading rumors about the enemy's low intellectual and cultural level. For example, the Soviet Union is said to be barbarous, uncivilized, aggressive and so forth. "I am most disturbed by the attempt to 'dehumanize' socialism, the Soviet society and the Soviet people, to force the Americans to forget that these are people, even if they are of a different nationality," Academician G. A. Arbatov remarked. "This is typical of the propaganda serving the military preparations."¹²

We can assume that this is also an attempt to give others the attributes the outside world ascribes to the Americans themselves; it is known that they feel inferior to Europeans in some ways. In England or in France, for instance, there is the popular belief that most Americans are uncouth and anti-intellectual, badly educated and boorish, presumptuous and vulgar (even some Americans do not dispute these cliches). Under the influence of psychological mechanisms, Americans are inclined to ascribe these features (the degree to which these accusations are valid is unimportant) to others, and this helps them to "get rid of their complexes" and recover from injuries.

The organizers of propaganda campaigns who have some knowledge of Freudian psychology count on the exploitation of these unconscious mechanisms. They also make extensive use of the factor of fear in fueling anti-Soviet hysteria and molding public opinion.¹³

The fear of war and universal extinction and the related natural desire to lower the level of confrontation and tension have still not led to the deep conviction that military-strategic parity with the Soviet Union will henceforth be a constant factor in international relations and will have to be accepted even by those who view it as a negative development.

Negative Stereotypes and the Possibility of Their Elimination

The negative feelings of competition and of hatred for the Soviet Union, which are constantly cultivated by rightwing forces and the mass media, are periodically intensified by the increasing anti-Sovietism of official Washington policy.

For example, "positive feelings" for the USSR, according to Gallup polls, were expressed by 1 percent of all respondents in 1953, 5 percent in 1956, 17 percent in 1966, 45 percent in 1973, 21 percent in 1976, 26 percent in 1978, 34 percent in 1979, 13 percent in 1980, 21 percent in 1982 and 9 percent in 1983. In December 1984, according to Harris data, only 7 percent categorized the Soviet Union as an "ally" or "friendly" country, whereas 90 percent expressed negative comments (36 percent called it "unfriendly" and 54 percent called it "hostile").¹⁴

The negative features ascribed to the Soviet Union and the "Russians" can be summarized briefly as the following set of stereotypes of mass thinking: the complete submission of the individual to the government bureaucracy (in contrast to the American "freedom of the individual"); the absence of human weaknesses, passions and emotions in the population, widespread "ideological fanaticism" intolerant of anyone else's views, and prescribed ways of thinking and standards of behavior; the government's attempts to spread its ideology, the "communist religion," to the entire world by force; atheism, the rejection of Christian, universally accepted standards of morality and a lack of respect for the labor of others and for private property as a symbol of individual labor and success; amorality in international policy as a result of atheism, the tendency to adhere only to the belief that "the end justifies the means" in spreading Soviet ideological, economic and military influence, treachery and dishonesty and the reluctance to keep promises and abide by international treaties (in short, "the Russians cannot be trusted").

The existence of these negative stereotypes is attested to by the results of the abovementioned surveys. During these, 74 percent of all respondents agreed that "the main problem in our relations with the communist world is that it threatens our religious and moral values"; 65 percent believed that "if we are weak, the Soviet Union will take the opportunity to attack us or our allies in Europe and Japan"; 69 percent believed that "the Soviet Union is our enemy because it wants to spread communism to other countries." Furthermore, the contradictory nature of American public opinion, particularly with regard to foreign policy issues, allows conflicting ideas to coexist in the minds of people. For example, in the opinion of 70 percent of all respondents, "the idea that the Soviets are the cause of all problems in the world is a dangerous oversimplification"; 53 percent (vs. 22 percent) believed that "the United States would be safer if we could stop fighting against the spread of communism and learn to live with it, as we are living with China and Yugoslavia."¹⁵

Many of the specific negative beliefs and stereotypes with regard to other countries and peoples can be destroyed quite quickly if they are not reinforced by continuous propaganda in the mass media. For example, the vehement mass hatred of the Germans and Japanese in World War II disappeared quite quickly from the American mind as soon as they stopped being called the enemy and became respected allies and partners of the United States. Now it is even difficult to believe, for example, that such pejorative and contemptuous labels were pinned to the image of the Japanese in the 1940's. And even in the 1950's the Americans regarded them as "cheap imitators" and treated them with unconcealed arrogance. Now the "imitators" are crowding the Americans out of many fields of science and technology and are arousing as much envy as admiration.

Therefore, in themselves the negative stereotypes referring to other peoples and countries, just as chauvinistic hatred, are transitory and temporary if they are not fueled constantly by old and new claims and the propaganda of superiority, whether in the spheres of economics, culture and politics or in ethnic and racial relations. The most tenacious and inveterate racist prejudices and stereotypes in the United States with regard to blacks were shaken severely in the 1960's and 1970's by the successes of the civil rights movement and the resulting changes in the viewpoints and tone of the mass media.

In addition to their characteristic "national conceit" (or, in the words of famous politician J. Fulbright, "smugness born of strength"), the Americans are also distinguished by the opposite trait--the ability to feel a profound sense of internationalism and respect for the achievements, history and culture of other peoples (this applies primarily to democratic forces and the more politically aware segments of society). This is true even in the case of the Russian people, who had long-standing and sometimes quite strong bonds with the American people--in the past and within the memory of present generations.

This is why feelings of affection and friendship can be quite intense at times when the friction in Soviet-American relations is reduced and the tone of official anti-Soviet rhetoric is softened. This was the case, for example, in 1972-1974, when public opinion polls displayed a quick and dramatic increase--from 5 to 30 percent, and then even to 45 percent--in "positive feelings" about the Soviet Union, interest in it and sympathy for it. And even the anti-Sovietism of part of the population and the negative reaction to communism as a social system, which are recorded in public opinion polls and are widely publicized in the press, are not as strong as they are usually portrayed in American sociological literature. After all, the majority of anti-Soviet stereotypes were invented and disseminated by the press when Americans knew little about foreign affairs in general and life in the Soviet Union in particular; these negative stereotypes are frequently based on such a flimsy mixture of nonsense, lies and misrepresentation that they are easily destroyed by access to more or less objective information.

Besides this, the negative stereotypes instilled in the public mind by the mass media are a set of primarily emotional cliches rather than ideologically sound and rational statements. They usually do not contain intelligent criticism of the presumed principles of socioeconomic affairs in the Soviet society or the fundamental differences between socialism and capitalism: The ideas about "communism" in the mass mind usually boil down, as mentioned above, to the simple belief that it is the personification of atheism and amorality. This belief is supplemented by the lies about the absence of personal life and lively entertainment, about the crushing burden of heavy "compulsory" labor and about the discouragement of individuality and the absence of normal human emotions. This image usually grows dim or falls apart completely in encounters with reality, when the public learns more about the Soviet people's way of life, character traits and behavior, particularly when it involves a show of emotions. For example, Soviet gymnast Olga Korbut made an unexpectedly strong impression on Americans in 1972 when she performed in the Olympics: She broke down in tears after her poor performance on one apparatus. Television commentators and the viewing audience were astounded by the Russian girl's "humanity."

It is also significant that there has been a perceptible increase in recent years in the number of Americans who believe that, regardless of "whether we like each other or not," the two main military powers must learn to find a common language and resolve problems through negotiation under the present conditions of the mounting danger of universal extinction. This belief is usually expressed in the following words: "We can either live with the Soviets on one planet or die with them." Polls indicate that whereas only

46 percent of the Americans believed that the United States could not win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union in 1982, 89 percent felt that there could be no winner in a nuclear war--that both sides would be destroyed--in 1984. Evidence of the more sober approach and the desire to discard the familiar negative stereotypes with regard to the Soviet Union and its socio-economic and political system can be found in the opinion shared by 67 percent of all respondents: "We must live and let live; let the communists have their system, and we will have ours. There is enough room on earth for both."¹⁶

In general, the psychological mood in the United States with regard to Soviet-American relations and the issues of war and peace is unstable and prone to fluctuation, particularly when public opinion is manipulated by rightwing forces. The contradictory nature of these attitudes, the obviously reactionary nature of some of them and the fact that many prejudices are rooted in the depths of American history do not mean, however, that progressive forces in the United States and other countries must wait until the negative feelings are gradually dissipated by the passage of time. Their energetic efforts, including the actions of the Communist Party, USA, peace organizations, associations of scientists, physicians, union members and women, and black organizations in support of strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union and in support of detente, are contributing to the growth of goodwill toward the USSR and promoting the normalization of relations with it.

The experience of the last two decades also testifies that when common sense and responsibility prevail in the approach of Washington leaders to Soviet-American relations, this approach has a favorable impact on the mass mentality, contributing to the destruction of negative stereotypes in ideas about the Soviet Union, the creation of positive attitudes and the growth of trust.

The history of Soviet-American relations reveals that important agreements and treaties--political, military and economic--were concluded even under extremely difficult conditions, in an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. The conclusion of agreements on the important problems of the present day, however, could be simplified and accelerated by the creation of a healthy psychological climate in the United States for the development of positive relations with the Soviet Union.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate," Wash., 1978, p 306.
2. G. Kennan, "The State of U.S.-Soviet Relations: Breaking the Spell," in "The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security," edited by G. Prins, London, 1984, p 129.
3. See, in particular, Ye. V. Yegorova, "'Neonationalism' in Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 10--Editor's note.

4. M. McGwire, "The Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence," in "The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security," p 90. Also see D. Yankelovich and L. Kaagan, "Assertive America," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1981, vol 59, No 3, pp 696-713.
5. THE HARRIS SURVEY, 24 May 1984.
6. It must be said that the desire for "revenge" is usually not self-generated. It is most often stimulated by the government and the media, especially television.
7. D. Leggett and C. Waterlow, "The War Games That Superpowers Play," London, 1983, p 21.
8. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, for example, said that "the world is approaching its end through God's will, I trust, and each day the end comes closer" (quoted in PEOPLE'S WORLD, 2 February 1985).
9. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy. A Briefing Book for the 1984 Elections," N.Y., 1984, p 37.
10. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Boston, 2 April 1983.
11. S. Keen, "Faces of the Enemy," ESQUIRE, February 1984, p 67.
12. G. A. Arbatov, "The Time for Decisions," KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 7 March 1985.
13. Yu. A. Zamoshkin, "The Nuclear Threat and the Factor of Fear," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 3.
14. THE GALLUP POLL, 23 October 1983; THE HARRIS SURVEY, 27 December 1984.
15. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy," pp 27, 35.
16. Ibid., p 37.

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NUCLEAR FREEZE DEBATE IN U.S. CONGRESS VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 85 (signed to press 18 Sep 85) pp 69-76

[Article by Ye. N. Yershova: "Congress and the Issue of the Nuclear Freeze"]

[Text] The issue of the nuclear freeze has been the focus of the fiercest political battles in the 1980's. The idea of a mutually declared moratorium on the growth of certain components of U.S. and USSR nuclear forces as a step toward effective arms control is not new. It was suggested several times in the past, even within the Congress. But it was not until the 1980's that it gave rise to a mass antiwar movement¹ and aroused the rapt interest of the general public and the legislators.

In its present form the idea of the nuclear freeze was set forth in 1979 by R. Forsberg,² who appealed to the two great powers for "a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems."³ This proposal aroused the interest of peace organizations, which saw it as a slogan capable of uniting broad segments of the public.

They decided to make use of the 1980 elections for referendums. They were able to make this issue a matter of voter consideration in some districts in New England. Surveys indicated the presence of strong antiwar feelings. By 1982 the "nuclear freeze movement" had acquired the features of a genuine mass movement. This was the first success of this kind for peaceful forces since the war in Vietnam.

The growth of the movement had a serious effect on the federal government, especially Congress. It is known to be relatively more dependent on the voters than the administration by virtue of its position in the machinery of public administration. The opposition segment of the political elite, with its negative attitudes toward the uncontrolled buildup of nuclear arms and the dangerous escalation of Soviet-American friction, is widely represented in the Congress, especially in the House of Representatives. When the members of this opposition proposed a freeze on U.S. and USSR nuclear weapons in 1982 and 1983, they admitted that they were doing this in response to public pressure. In this case, we are "not leaders," but merely "followers" of the demands of the public, said N. D'Amours (Democrat, New Hampshire).⁴

At the insistence of the public, several resolutions aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war were submitted to Congress for consideration. The authors of these proposals proceeded from the existence of an approximate balance between U.S. and USSR nuclear arsenals. The tone was set at the beginning of March 1982 by the resolution of E. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) and M. Hatfield (Republican, Maryland), which was introduced in the Senate; In the House of Representatives the author of a similar resolution was E. Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts). These resolutions called upon the USSR and United States "to strive for the complete cessation of the nuclear arms race" and to reach a decision on a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and delivery systems.⁵

With an eye on the mood of the public, the opponents of the resolutions avoided direct criticism of them in many cases, but made the implementation of this idea conditional upon terms which essentially nullified it. The most typical was the Jackson-Warner resolution (the former was the late Democratic senator and the latter is a Republican from Virginia). It was based on the false postulate of the U.S. "lag" in nuclear weapons. The resolution proposed that administration military programs be carried out first for the achievement of "parity," that this be followed by the negotiation of mutual arms reductions with the USSR, and that the nuclear freeze be instituted only after all of this. Its 57 co-authors in the Senate obviously wanted to help the White House build up U.S. military strength.

In all, more than 30 legislative proposals connected with the nuclear freeze or nuclear arms control were discussed in both congressional houses in 1982. In some cases attempts were made to "reconcile" the two aforementioned approaches and to find some kind of compromise. The issue of the SALT II treaty was also raised again: For example, Senator J. Biden (Democrat, Delaware) proposed the consideration of its ratification without delay, and Congressman J. Leach (Republican, Iowa) asked that the treaty be ratified as an executive agreement, requiring a simple majority vote in both houses. The resolution of Chairman C. Zablocki (Democrat, Wisconsin) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also contained an appeal for the ratification of the treaty.⁶ The resolution of the former chairman of the related Senate committee, C. Percy (Republican, Illinois), proposed that the American side observe the provisions of the SALT I and SALT II treaties to the degree that they are observed by the Soviet Union.

These resolutions aroused lively debates in committees and subcommittees, and then in both houses of the 97th Congress, debates comparable, in the opinion of Speaker of the House T. O'Neill, to the fall 1969 debates (establishing Congress' pointedly negative view on the continuation of the war in Vietnam). In the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, for example, the nuclear freeze proposal was supported by the majority (26 to 9), and the results of the vote were obviously influenced by the New York gathering of a million antiwar demonstrators a few days earlier (on 12 June 1982).

As a result of strong pressure from the administration and rightwing forces, however, the House of Representatives supported the resolution of W. Broomfield (Republican, Michigan), similar in content to the Jackson-Warner resolution

and supportive of administration policy, by a slight majority (204 to 202). Opponents of the freeze saw the results of this vote as a victory, but the supporters of the idea did not view them as a defeat either. They felt that the antinuclear opposition in Congress had finally acquired such broad dimensions that it could influence military and foreign policymaking.

In the Senate and its committees, on the other hand, where the Republicans held the majority, the situation was quite different. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution by a vote of 9 to 6, divided according to party affiliation. The resolution of the chairman of this committee, Republican C. Percy, was approved. It contained an appeal for the observance of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, but it also supported "Reagan's efforts to conduct talks with the USSR," efforts which have not been reinforced by any kind of action. The attempt of Democratic Senators C. Pell (Rhode Island) and A. Cranston (California) to push the freeze proposal through as an amendment to Percy's resolution was rejected by a vote of 10 to 7. Nevertheless, the Senate committee's approval of a resolution even in this wording displeased the administration, which is against the ratification of the SALT II treaty. As a result, the Percy resolution was not discussed by the Senate; the leaders of the Republican Party were afraid that the debate could split the ranks of the Republican senators and leave administration policy open to the criticism of the supporters of the freeze and extreme rightwing senators, who believe that the White House line is not hard enough.

The leaders of antiwar organizations and their sympathizers felt that the 1982 discussions of a broad range of issues connected with administration military-political strategy and the growth of the antinuclear movement made the idea of the freeze more popular. This was attested to by public opinion polls and by referendums during the 1982 elections, which increased the number of supporters of this idea by more than 30 in Congress. The Capitol's refusal in December 1982 to allocate the funds requested by the President for the MX program,⁷ the first refusal of this kind in the postwar period, was viewed by peace activists as proof that they would be successful next year, in 1983.

Their optimism was unwarranted. The freeze resolutions were opposed even more vehemently in the 98th Congress.

The resolutions introduced in both houses contained something new--an appeal for nuclear arms reductions--but they were basically a repetition of the 1982 resolutions.

Supporters of the administration fought against them on all levels.

For the purpose of obstruction, many counterresolutions were introduced, and countless amendments and amendments to amendments were proposed during the discussion of these matters. After discussing 15 draft resolutions, the House Foreign Affairs Committee nevertheless approved C. Zablocki's resolution in support of the freeze on 8 March 1983 by a vote of 27 to 9 (it was supported by all but one of the Democrats on the committee and four of the Republicans).

The supporters of the administration in the House of Representatives responded by resorting to the "filibuster" tactic. They made interminable speeches on each matter in question and demanded a roll call for each of the 10 amendments. For example, on 16 March 1983, the first day of the debates on this matter, the House session lasted 13 hours. The resolution's opponents asked about its effects on various American weapon systems, taking the supporters of the freeze by surprise. They were unprepared to discuss the specific details, could not agree on their answers, and even contradicted one another in many cases. Their confusion kept the undecided congressmen of centrist views from supporting the resolution.⁸ The debates dragged on--to the delight of the administration. Congressman J. Kemp (Republican, New York) bragged that "the Democrats planned to quickly go over the resolution, put it to a vote and pass it the same day. They were unable to do this.... Their campaign lost its dynamism."

As a result, the debates in the House dragged on for 2 months. More than 60 amendments to the freeze resolution were introduced, most of them for the purpose of rendering it meaningless. The resolution's supporters had to go to a great deal of trouble to limit the discussion of each amendment to 45 hours. In the words of C. Zablocki, it was the first time in his 35 years in Congress that he had encountered such flagrant procrastination.

The majority of proposals in favor of a freeze took the form, just as in the previous year, of joint resolutions of the Senate and House. This kind of proposal can only become law if it is approved by both houses and signed by the President. It became obvious that the balance of power in the Congress would not allow the supporters of arms control in the House and Senate to secure the two-thirds majority needed to override a presidential veto.

Furthermore, all of the nuclear freeze resolutions discussed in 1982-1984 were in the nature of recommendations: They only stated the opinion of Congress or advised the President. Not one would have been binding, even if it had won congressional and presidential approval. Nevertheless, the opponents of the freeze asserted that Congress was encroaching on the President's prerogatives by making a decision on arms control. Congressman S. Stratton (Democrat, New York) questioned the very right of the public to protest White House foreign policy.

It must be said that the supporters of the freeze, despite the popularity of this idea in American society, took a timid, essentially defensive stance in Congress, and many of their statements sounded like excuses. The resolution on the freeze "only expresses the wishes of the Congress and does not obligate the President," explained Speaker of the House T. O'Neill. And the author of the resolution, C. Zablocki, eventually proposed his own amendment to it, stating bluntly: "Nothing in this resolution should be interpreted as an encroachment upon the constitutional power of the President to make treaties."⁹ In an attempt to put an end to the lengthy debates and to win the votes of the undecided, the supporters of the freeze in the House of Representatives adopted many amendments, changing the nature of the original resolution considerably. It was with good reason that House Minority Leader R. Michel (Republican, Illinois) said before the beginning of the vote that the freeze "in its pure form" had "already been lost," so there was no reason for any undue worry.¹⁰

Besides this, in contrast to the 1982 resolution, C. Zablocki's 1983 proposal included an appeal not only for a freeze on nuclear weapons but also for their reduction. The exact sequence of these measures also became the subject of endless arguments. The original draft proposed that a freeze agreement be concluded first and that arms reductions be negotiated afterward. The opponents of the freeze tried to link the two measures in such a way as to make one conditional upon the other and to create something like a vicious circle. They were eventually able to do this: The House supported the amendment of E. Levitas (Democrat, Georgia) and H. Hyde (Republican, Illinois), which essentially said that if the United States and USSR could not agree on arms reductions within a reasonable period of time after the conclusion of a freeze agreement, this agreement would be nullified.¹¹

Another loophole was the stipulation that "submarines are not categorized as delivery systems." The resolution also stated that nothing should impede the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe in accordance with the 1979 NATO decision until a "bilateral agreement" on the freeze and on nuclear arms reductions had been concluded.¹² The final text of the resolution also contained the statement that the agreement on the freeze should not prevent the United States from taking measures "to protect the lives of American citizens" responsible for the maintenance of "strategic systems" and should not impede the "improvement of strategic bomber components connected with the safeguarding of security."

In this form the resolution was approved by the House on 4 May 1983 by a vote of 278 to 149. It was supported by 218 Democrats and 60 Republicans. Countless compromises divested it of much of its meaning. Nevertheless, it not only expressed the public belief in the need for a nuclear freeze but also acknowledged the existence of an approximate balance in nuclear potential and the possibility of controlling a mutual freeze. This gave the supporters of this measure reason to view the House decision as a serious victory.

By the time the next round of the struggle began, this time in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the political situation in the country had changed. The administration attempted to quell the wave of mass antiwar demonstrations and to weaken opposition in the Congress by taking a number of steps to convince the public of the White House's love of peace and secure bipartisan support for its policy. Under the influence of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations,¹³ the supporters of the freeze in the House and Senate agreed to stand behind the administration in exchange for its promise to step up the talks with the USSR.

When the resolution was discussed in the Senate committee, the administration's supporters again used the tactic of delays and procrastination. In particular, Chairman C. Percy of the committee postponed the decision on the freeze so many times that Senator A. Cranston resorted to a move unprecedented in the history of this body. He used the procedural rule allowing members to convene a committee session against the wishes of the chairman (this requires the signatures of the majority of committee members). But when this session was convened (on 2 August 1983), the Republicans refused to put the freeze to a vote, and the discussion was postponed once again.

The vote was not held until the end of September. Its results, just as the debates themselves, were influenced by the provocative incident involving the South Korean airliner and the related anti-Soviet campaign. The committee rejected the resolution by a vote of 10 to 7; members voted according to party affiliation, with the exception of Democrat E. Zorinsky (Nebraska), who joined the opponents of the freeze. Percy then turned the nuclear freeze resolution over to the Senate, although he recommended its rejection.

The Senate was in no hurry to begin discussing the resolution. It was not until the end of October 1983 that E. Kennedy introduced a freeze proposal in the form of an amendment to a bill on the U.S. public debt. He called the mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze an "immediate objective of arms control." On 31 October the amendment was rejected by 55 senators. It was supported by 42.

The congressional discussions of the nuclear freeze issue in 1983 were strongly influenced by the abovementioned report of the Scowcroft Commission and by the resolution of Senators S. Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) and W. Cohen (Republican, Maine). The latter called their proposal "reduction through modernization" (or "reduction through buildup"), referring to the quantities involved in the replacement of old warheads with new ones. Its authors had different ideas about the connection between their resolution and the idea of the freeze. Cohen asserted that their proposal should be acceptable to the supporters and the opponents of the modernization of the U.S. Armed Forces, whereas Nunn felt that it was incompatible with the idea of a freeze.¹⁴ The antiwar movement took a negative view of the Nunn-Cohen resolution. According to R. Forsberg, it was a veiled attempt to legalize the unlimited modernization of weapons.

The vote on allocations for the MX program dealt a serious blow to the hopes of antiwar organizations anticipating the support of a large part of the Congress. As a result of strong administration pressure and under the influence of the Scowcroft Commission's conclusions, the House approved the MX allocations on 24 May 1983 by a vote of 239 to 186. The Senate made a similar decision the next day. The congressmen who voted for the MX included many who had supported the nuclear freeze less than a month before. This seemingly more than strange contradiction is actually the best proof of the Congress' real position, its willingness to verbally support the highest principles, especially if they are popular with the electorate and are worded in general and unbinding terms. When it comes to specific arms programs, however, the majority of congressmen easily forget these principles and consistently support the buildup and modernization of armed forces.

The position of the 98th Congress in 1983 on the entire range of arms issues and arms control severely disillusioned the peace-loving public, especially the leaders and activists of antiwar organizations. This is one of the reasons for their change in tactics, including the tactics employed in their relations with Congress. The presidential elections were coming in 1984, and the majority of antiwar organizations concentrated on bringing about the defeat of Republicans in the belief that the freeze question would then be resolved without delay. This opinion was reinforced by the statements of contenders

for the Democratic presidential nomination, who called themselves supporters of the freeze. The Democratic Party platform A. Cranston drafted even proposed that, if a Democrat should win the presidential race, he would announce the cessation of the testing of nuclear warheads and the testing and deployment of delivery systems, both strategic and medium-range, within the first hour after taking office.

The supporters of the cessation of the arms race inside and outside the Capitol not only continued to fight for the freeze but also decided to modify the resolution in such a way that its congressional approval would automatically exclude the financing of several arms programs.

This approach to the matter attested to significant changes in the position of its supporters, who had never deliberately linked this measure with specific programs in the past. The freeze proposal appealed to many precisely because it was simple and comprehensible, but the discussion of specific programs would unavoidably make the matter dependent on expert appraisals; the serious confusion of the congressmen with antiwar views when questions were asked about the specific details of the measure in 1983 has already been discussed. In 1984, however, they decided to word their appeal in the form of a ban on certain military programs, because the House's "power of the pocketbook," the power to block the financing of any program, gave them a chance to do so.

They planned to first stop the work on the MX program, regarding this as the most destabilizing weapon. The supporters of arms control in Congress and in antiwar organizations felt that this was completely feasible because the production of these missiles had been supported by a majority of only nine votes in the House in 1983.

Several freeze proposals were introduced in the Senate and House in 1984. In addition to those similar to the one approved by the House in 1983, a resolution on a "moratorium on the arms race" was discussed. Its authors in the Senate were Democrats E. Kennedy and A. Cranston and Republican D. Durenberger (Minnesota), and in the House it was introduced by E. Markey and more than 80 other congressmen from both parties. The resolution requested the President to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing and deployment of new nuclear warheads for a year. If the President should not support the freeze proposal, the document said, the Congress would stop allocating funds for the abovementioned weapon systems.

Another House resolution was introduced by N. Mavroules (Democrat, Massachusetts), which went even further and envisaged the blocking of funds for the production, testing and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons. The resolution of C. Pell (Democrat, Rhode Island), introduced in the Senate, was more moderate: It only requested the President to propose the temporary cessation of the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons to the USSR and begin American-Soviet talks on these matters.

As a result of lengthy debates on arms control issues, virtually all of the administration's requests for military programs were satisfied. In the Senate the nuclear freeze resolution was again rejected on 5 October 1984 (58 to 40), and in the House it was not even put to a vote.

The supporters of arms control were able, however, to win the Senate approval of the legislative amendment of D. Bumpers (Democrat, Arkansas) and another 23 senators from both parties, asking the administration to observe the conditions of unratified agreements on strategic and other weapons--on the condition of their observance by the Soviet Union. The Senate also approved a legislative amendment on a nuclear test ban, initiated by E. Kennedy. It requested the President to work toward the quickest possible ratification of Soviet-American agreements (the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes) and to simultaneously propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of talks on a complete nuclear test ban treaty.

The President and the administration had to make a vigorous effort to surmount the pressure of supporters of arms limitation. In particular, he had to give up the role of an "uncompromising fighter" against the Soviet Union and an opponent of talks, change his political tactics and put forth a number of foreign policy initiatives. In this way, Ronald Reagan was able to gradually relieve the pressure "from below" in favor of the freeze and other measures to eliminate the threat of war. The overwhelming majority of Americans still support the freeze, but many have mistaken ideas about administration foreign policy. In particular, they believe that it "supports the freeze."

In January 1985 Senators E. Kennedy and M. Hatfield introduced another such resolution in Congress, but it would be difficult to expect its approval by Congress now that the mass public movement has grown weaker. The exact date for the discussion of this issue has not been set, and no one knows if the resolution will be discussed at all in Congress this year.

In this way, the fate of the many nuclear freeze resolutions confirmed the fact that Congress discusses such matters only under strong pressure from the antiwar movement and mass protest demonstrations. Although the nuclear freeze resolution was not approved by Congress, the history of its discussion testifies that the mass antiwar movement and antinuclear opposition in Congress have become a perceptible factor in U.S. domestic politics. They are playing the role of a restraining factor, forcing the administration to sometimes soften its rhetoric and make foreign policy concessions.

The struggle in Congress between supporters and opponents of the arms race is still going on. The reluctance of the U.S. administration to conduct the talks with the USSR in Geneva from a constructive standpoint seriously disturbs many legislators, who are putting forth initiatives in the hope of establishing favorable conditions for these talks. For example, Senators P. Simon (Democrat, Illinois) and M. Hatfield introduced a bill on the prohibition of strategic and nuclear warhead tests during the entire period of the Soviet-American talks. A group of congressmen headed by E. Markey asked the President to declare a moratorium on the testing and deployment of strategic missiles, medium-range nuclear weapons and space weapons, and also to stop underground nuclear tests during this period.

Under these conditions, the statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, published on 30 July 1985, on the Soviet Union's

decision to unilaterally stop all nuclear explosions on 6 August 1985, seems exceptionally pertinent. "We ask the Government of the United States," the statement said, "to stop its nuclear tests on the same date, which is commemorated throughout the world as the day of the Hiroshima tragedy....

"The matter now depends on the United States, its government and Congress."

Washington, however, not only refused to join the USSR in its declared moratorium on nuclear explosions, but even conducted a new underground nuclear test in Nevada. Furthermore, the nuclear explosion was scheduled for the days when mankind honored the memory of the victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. military establishment 40 years ago.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the history of this movement, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 2, pp 55-62--Editor's note.
2. Arms control expert R. Forsberg completed her work on her doctoral dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the end of the 1970's and was also studying the effects of the arms race on society at that time as a member of the Boston Research Team. At the beginning of the 1980's the team founded the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (with R. Forsberg as its president and director), which played a significant role in creating the "campaign for a nuclear freeze," a broad antiwar coalition. In 1984 Forsberg was instrumental in the creation of a political action committee, "Citizens for a Freeze, 1984," which she also headed.
3. R. Forsberg, "A Bilateral Nuclear-Weapons Freeze," SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, November 1982, pp 52-61.
4. "1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac," Wash., 1983, p 116.
5. FACTS ON FILE, 30 March 1982, p 222.
6. He died on 3 December 1983--Editor's note.
7. The House refusal to finance this program was connected with disagreements over the proposed basing method (permanent or mobile).
8. Congress' position was also influenced by the skepticism of several prominent politicians and experts supporting the normalization of relations with the USSR and the cessation of the arms race. They expressed serious doubts about the feasibility and expediency of the freeze. One of their main arguments was that the process would be impossible to control.
9. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 4 May 1983, p H2619.
10. Ibid., p H2659.

11. Ibid., p H2622.
12. Ibid.
13. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 10, pp 119-124--Editor's note.
14. "U.S.-Soviet Relations. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations," Wash., 1983, p 158.

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U.S. DISCUSSION ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN NUCLEAR SPHERE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 85 (signed to press 18 Sep 85) pp 84-89

[Article by I. N. Shcherbakov]

[Text] Leading American experts on U.S. foreign and military policy have been discussing "measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and resolve crises" for over 2 years. The Reagan Administration's policy statements on the matter have been set forth in a report,¹ "Direct Lines of Communication and Other Measures To Strengthen Stability," delivered to Congress in April 1983 by Pentagon chief C. Weinberger.

The American leadership's decision to plan various "measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war" was primarily the result of a desire to quell the wave of criticism of the Reagan Administration policy line of an unprecedented nuclear arms race by broad segments of the American public, including the scientific community. In addition, these measures also reflect the dissatisfaction of upper echelons of government with the strategy of "deterrence" and are viewed by them as a means of adjusting and repairing its shaky foundation. But the emphasis is not on the prevention of nuclear war in general, but only on preventing the start of a nuclear war as a result of an "accident, miscalculation or provocation by a third country or terrorist group"²--as administration spokesmen said during congressional hearings. Furthermore, these measures fit in with the strategy of "deterrence." It is no wonder that when Ronald Reagan addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 8 May 1985 and put forth his "plan to relax military tension" (containing such "confidence-building measures" as the "regular exchange of observers by the USSR and United States at military exercises and military installations" and the "establishment of a constant line of communication between military leaders" in the two countries for the exchange of reports and other information on daily military activity), he again associated the proposal of "measures to reduce international tension" with U.S. adherence to the strategy of "deterrence." He also made another attempt to prove that this strategy supposedly performs the function of preventing nuclear war.³

American experts from Harvard Law School, Stanford University and several other academic centers have taken the opposite approach to the "measures to prevent nuclear war" and settle crises. They agree that these measures are not compatible with the strategy of "deterrence." For example, Professor

A. Krass from the School of Natural Sciences (Hampshire College) remarks in his article "The Death of Deterrence" that it "never answered the question of how to prevent nuclear war. It focuses on how to use nuclear weapons."⁴

Many experts believe that confidence-building measures in the nuclear sphere should become an integral and important part of the arms limitation process and play a special role in preventing nuclear war, including ones started accidentally.⁵ These scientists associate the causes of the mounting danger of nuclear war and the need to plan confidence-building measures with the United States' own policy in its attempts to undermine the existing balance of power in strategic weapons and to achieve military superiority.

For example, Cornell University researcher Jane Sharp feels that the development and deployment of destabilizing strategic nuclear systems, such as the MX missile, the Pershing II medium-range missile, the cruise missile and others, have increased the danger of nuclear war as a result of an accident or miscalculation.⁶

In a list of the factors provoking the start of a nuclear war as a result of an accident or unauthorized action, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Perry included the tendency to deploy nuclear systems close to the USSR (the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in several West European countries) and the increasing technical malfunctions of the computers of the U.S. early warning system, leading to false alarms.⁷

Washington's plan for the creation [sozdaniye] of a broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements is also interpreted as something heightening the possibility of the start of a nuclear conflict as a result of accidents or unauthorized actions.⁸

Another common feature of these American researchers is that the majority admit that the "measures to prevent nuclear war" and "resolve crises" should rest on the international legal basis of existing bilateral Soviet-American treaties, such as the agreements signed on 30 September 1981 on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war between the USSR and United States and on measures to improve the line of direct USSR-U.S. communication, the 25 May 1972 agreement on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and the air space over it, and the 29 May 1972 fundamentals of interrelations between the USSR and the United States. Pointing out the fact that these documents have played a useful role and have laid the legal foundation for joint U.S.-USSR actions to prevent nuclear war as a result of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons or errors in the identification of objects by early warning systems, they also recommend the enhancement of the effectiveness of these agreements.

In particular, in a study entitled "Beyond the Hot Line: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis," Harvard Law School experts state that the present system of bilateral Soviet-American agreements in this sphere is deficient because the obligations they stipulate do not establish a precise and efficient mechanism of bilateral USSR-U.S. consultations in the event of a crisis or the danger of a nuclear conflict as a result of accidents, miscalculations or the

unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.⁹ Stanford University Professor A. George blames the current administration for this, because it still has not declared the Fundamentals of Interrelations between the USSR and United States to be an enforceable document. Furthermore, it is obviously avoiding any discussion of its exact position with regard to this important document.¹⁰ Quoting from it, A. George points up the importance of the statement that both sides "will do everything within their power to avoid military confrontations and prevent the start of a nuclear war. They will always display restraint in their interrelations and will be willing to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means."¹¹ The American researcher virtually admits that although the Reagan Administration expects the Soviet Union to show "restraint" in international affairs, it refuses to show the same "restraint" in its foreign policy.¹²

The most detailed set of "measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war as a result of accidents or miscalculations" and "resolve crises" has been elaborated precisely by these experts from Harvard Law School and Stanford University. For example, W. Ury and R. Smoke from Harvard proposed a number of measures to "stabilize and avert crises," which can, in their opinion, be combined with existing Soviet-American agreements in this sphere to constitute a "crisis-management system" for the purpose of reducing the risk of nuclear war. This would entail the use of "negotiated Soviet-American procedures" before or during a crisis. They suggest that the basis of these procedures consist of the provisions of the Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and the air space over it, which they describe as highly effective. They suggest that this be used as a model for agreements on the prevention of incidents in the air and on land as a result of the accidental invasion of adjacent zones by airplanes or units and subunits of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces.¹³

One of the most important ways of reducing the risk of nuclear war, according to the authors, is the creation of nuclear crisis management centers. Their functions would include the exchange of information between the USSR and United States on the possibility of nuclear terrorist acts by third countries; the exchange of reports on tests of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons; the submission of inquiries about disturbing joint military activities; the elaboration of a "code of behavior" for nuclear powers. These centers (preferably in Moscow and Washington) could also have the responsibility of the joint elaboration of certain procedures to "prevent and manage nuclear crises." The objects of these joint procedures would be the exact determination of the nature of a nuclear explosion (to learn if it is accidental, unauthorized, etc.); the elaboration of behavior patterns for nuclear powers in the event of a crisis and measures to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation with the aid of the joint analysis of possible conflict scenarios and the organization of special "games" for these purposes, and so forth. Besides this, the report suggests the elaboration of several methods of stopping hostilities with the aid of a series of standard scenarios agreed upon by the United States and the USSR in advance for the cessation of military operations.¹⁴

It is significant that the authors of the report realize in general that the measures they propose are contradictory and illusory in many respects. This applies mainly to the so-called "negotiated procedures" for the emergence of

nuclear powers from a nuclear conflict. They admit that some of these measures sound like an invitation to "limited" nuclear war, because their adoption essentially implies the permissibility of nuclear war. "These measures are not intended to deal with the essence of political conflicts, but are, rather, small practical steps to reduce the danger of nuclear war as a result of mis-calculations or accidents," W. Ury and R. Smoke write. "They can play a useful role only if both nuclear powers actively strive to prevent nuclear war."¹⁵

The Stanford University report prepared by J. Lewis, C. Blacker, A. George, W. Perry and others also suggests the creation of "a joint (Soviet-American) center to prevent accidental nuclear war and resolve crises." In their opinion, this center could perform informational exchange functions by issuing advance warnings of broad-scale military operations not covered by existing Soviet-American agreements and accords.¹⁶ The measures proposed in this report are essentially the same as those suggested in the Harvard Law School study. Here greater emphasis is placed on the exact details of "confidence-building measures" connected with reducing the possibility of the misinterpretation of U.S. and USSR military activity, particularly at the start of a crisis.

It is interesting that Senators S. Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) and J. Warner (Republican, Virginia) have taken an active part in this research. Soon after the publication of the Harvard Law School and Stanford University reports, they drafted a Senate resolution (No 392, 30 January 1984) requesting the President of the United States to begin talks with the USSR Government on measures to "reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation," including the creation of "centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war in both states."¹⁷ The two senators were the co-authors of a study prepared at Georgetown University and published in summer 1985. Earlier, in a journal published by the university, they listed the functions of "centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war": the discussion and elaboration of standard procedures pertaining to possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons; the maintenance of contacts in the event of incidents arising from the actions of terrorists possessing a nuclear weapon; the voluntary exchange of information about military activity that might be misinterpreted by the other side during a period of escalated international tension; the discussion of national nuclear doctrines and the activities of strategic nuclear forces (primarily those aspects of their activity prone to be misunderstood or misinterpreted) and the coordinated exchange of data on one another's strategic forces.¹⁸

Experts from the RAND Corporation (D. Landi, B. Augenstein, C. Crain and others) define the main functions of "confidence-building measures" with regard to crisis resolution as "the negotiation and coordination of measures for the stabilization of crises, de-escalation, military disengagement and the cessation of armed conflicts, and also for the prevention of nuclear terrorism."¹⁹ They lay emphasis on the compilation of the "guiding principles of crisis resolution" and the elaboration of a so-called code of behavior for the armed forces of the sides during a crisis. According to the American scientists, the essential conditions of crisis resolution are the unconditional control of the actions of the armed forces command on all levels by top-level political and military leaders and the total interaction of civilian and military leaders in the choice of the correct decisions to resolve crises. The

key element of their proposed system of "crisis resolution" consists of "confidence-building measures" to secure effective communication between the sides and reduce doubts and ambiguity in the analysis of one another's military activity before and during a crisis.

Some American researchers view the problem of preventing nuclear war as a result of accidents or unauthorized actions from the standpoint of the stronger political control of the "command, control and communication" system of U.S. nuclear forces by the administration, especially at a time of crisis. In particular, M. Willrich (Northern California Council on Foreign Relations) and R. Lebow (Cornell University) suggest that the President, in addition to creating "nuclear crisis management centers," convene the Scowcroft Commission for the purpose of taking measures to reinforce communication between "political and military leaders." They also recommend the revision of the system of procedures for the political control of U.S. nuclear forces in the European theater of military operations and the coordination of political decisionmaking at a time of crisis.²⁰

A departure from the previous euphoria over the "confidence-building measures" was recently noted in the scientific establishment. Increasing statements are being made to stress the limited possibilities of the "confidence-building measures" proposed by the administration and centers close to it to resolve crises affecting the fundamental interests of the sides. This was the conclusion, in particular, of experts K. Lewis and M. Lorell from the RAND Corporation, who note that the recommended "confidence-building measures" (focusing only on better communication and understanding) cannot resolve crises in cases involving deliberately provoked conflicts.²¹ American researchers have also become more aware of the need for a realistic and balanced approach to them, with a view to the fact that they might prove to be a useless and even dangerous foreign policy instrument, creating the illusion of effectiveness, in the event of a severe crisis in relations between the two powers. This has been accompanied by the growing awareness that the effectiveness of "confidence-building measures" as means of crisis resolution depends primarily on the resolution of cardinal problems in international relations--the relaxation of international tension, the improvement of intergovernmental relations between the USSR and the United States and the revision of the American administration's adventurist behavior provoking crises.²² Genuine confidence-building measures, some experts have remarked, can be successful only when the United States unconditionally observes such Soviet-American agreements as the SALT I agreement and the ABM limitation treaty and gives up its plans for the ABM system with space-based elements. The Washington director of the Council on Foreign Relations, A. Frye, believes that the success of confidence-building measures would be promoted by the U.S. observance of the provisions of the SALT II treaty and the use of the experience accumulated by the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of the SALT I agreement and the ABM treaty.²³ Confidence-building measures must be coordinated with the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, he stresses. The problem of nuclear arms control can be "partially" solved with the aid of confidence-building measures, but only in the presence of advances in nuclear arms limitation and reduction.²⁴

Researchers E. Rothschild and J. Wiesner direct attention to the effectiveness of such measures as moratoriums on the deployment of new weapons and on tests of new weapon systems, a freeze on nuclear weapons and no first use of nuclear weapons.²⁵

The opposite point of view is expressed by W. Perry, who suggests that the elaboration of "confidence-building measures" should not be connected with the reduction or limitation of nuclear armed forces and should constitute almost the chief aim of the arms control process.²⁶ It must be said that the tendency to view "confidence-building measures" as some kind of "separate alternative" to disarmament, an "all-weather" instrument operating independently of the state of international relations, even during a period of conflict, is characteristic of many American studies in this field, including the abovementioned reports of the researchers from Harvard Law School and Stanford University.

The U.S. discussion of measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and resolve crises indicates substantial differences between the approaches of the administration and the scientific community. The administration is concentrating on measures of a technical-informational nature, which do not have anything to do with the essence of the need to prevent nuclear war and reduce the risk of the start of this kind of war as a result of accidents, mistakes or unauthorized actions. Researchers with a realistic frame of mind disagree with the administration, advocating a broad range of political and international legal measures (in conjunction with the arms limitation and reduction process). C. Weinberger's report to the Congress said that the Defense Department feels that the idea of creating "nuclear crisis management centers" in the United States and the USSR is "premature." The reason was that these centers could reduce the decisionmaking flexibility of the upper echelon. The Pentagon was most disturbed by the possibility of the USSR using them for the "automatic investigation of any crisis" for the purpose of exposing U.S. policy.²⁷ The American administration countered this idea with the proposal of a "bilateral joint line of communication between the high command centers of the U.S. and USSR armed forces"; it is still the basis of the U.S. position on confidence-building measures. In their attempts to elaborate a group of "confidence-building measures" meeting their own interests and fitting into the nuclear arms race and escalation of international tension, U.S. officials are trying to portray their "confidence-building measures" as the result of some kind of consensus of the views of American politicians, the general public and the scientific community.

The discussion of these matters in the United States is far from over, however, and the opinions of experts are extremely divergent.

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 12 April 1983, p S4363.
2. "Nuclear Risk Reduction. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 98th Congress, 2d Session, April 1984," p 12.

3. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 13 May 1985, p 108.
4. A. Krass, "The Death of Deterrence," in "Policies for Common Security," SIPRI, 1985, p 607.
5. See, for example, E. Rothschild, "Common Security and Deterrence," *ibid.*, p 94.
6. J. Sharp, "Confidence-Building Measures and SALT," ARMS CONTROL, May 1982, p 55.
7. W. Perry, "Measures To Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War," ORBIS, Winter 1984, p 1033.
8. A. Rothschild, *Op. cit.*, pp 85-100.
9. W. Ury and R. Smoke, "Beyond the Hot Line: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis," Cambridge (Mass), 1984, p 39.
10. A. George, "Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention," Boulder (Colo), 1984.
11. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v borbe za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1977, p 121.
12. A. George, *Op. cit.*, p 394.
13. "Nuclear Risk Reduction," p 38.
14. W. Ury and R. Smoke, *Op. cit.*, pp 58-59.
15. *Ibid.*
16. J. Lewis, C. Blacker et al, "Next Steps in the Creation of an Accidental Nuclear War Prevention Center," ARMS CONTROL, May 1984, p 75.
17. "Nuclear Risk Reduction," p 5.
18. S. Nunn and J. Warner, "Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 1984, p 6.
19. D. Landi, B. Augenstein, C. Crain, W. Harris and B. Jenkins, "Improving the Means for Intergovernmental Communication in Crisis," SURVIVAL, September/October 1984, p 207.
20. M. Willrich, "Nuclear Crisis Management," BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, March 1985, p 52; R. Lebow, "Practical Ways To Avoid Superpower Crises," *ibid.*, January 1985, p 25.
21. K. Lewis and M. Lorell, "Confidence-Building Measures and Crisis-Resolution: Historical Perspectives," ORBIS, Summer 1984, p 303.

22. BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, January 1985, p 22.
23. A. Frye, "Confidence-Building Measures Relating to Nuclear Weapons: Precedents and Prospects in Confidence-Building Measures," in "Proceedings of International Symposium," Bonn, 24-27 May 1983, p 146.
24. Ibid.
25. "Policies for Common Security," pp 97, 137.
26. ORBIS, Winter 1984, pp 1029-1030.
27. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 12 April 1983, p S4365.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS JUNE-AUGUST 1985

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 85 (signed to press 18 Sep 85) pp 125-127

[Text] June

4-6 -- Soviet and American scientists attended a symposium "For Peace and Security in the Pacific Zone" in Khabarovsk. Ways of securing confidence-building measures in the Pacific region were investigated, and the prospects for cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural sphere were discussed.

The following meetings were held in Geneva as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

4, 11, 18, 25 -- meetings of the group on space weapons;

5, 12, 19, 26 -- meetings of the group on strategic weapons;

6, 13, 20, 27 -- meetings of the group on medium-range nuclear weapons.

5 -- A TASS statement was published in connection with the issuance of licenses by the U.S. Department of Commerce to several consortiums for the prospecting of manganese concretions in the international region of the Pacific seabed, where these actions by the U.S. Government are categorized as a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and as the continuation of efforts to undermine the convention and create an atmosphere of confusion in the world ocean.

6-12 -- A Soviet-American symposium, organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences with the aid of Princeton University (United States), was held in Moscow to discuss energy supply problems.

11 -- A TASS statement on President Reagan's speech of 10 June regarding U.S. policy on existing treaties and agreements in the sphere of strategic arms limitation says that the President's remarks clearly confirm that the U.S. administration has decided to continue the destruction of the system of treaties keeping the nuclear arms race under control and has started the process by undermining the Soviet-American SALT II treaty.

13 -- Second Secretary P. Stombauch of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was detained after committing an act of espionage. For his unlawful behavior he was declared persona non grata.

14 -- The latest session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to aid in the implementation of the goals and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Temporary Agreement on Some Measures To Limit Strategic Offensive Weapons, concluded on 26 May 1972, and the agreement of 30 September 1971 on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war between the USSR and the United States, ended in Geneva. Within the context of these general goals, the sides reached a common understanding on the need to reinforce the viability of the ABM limitation treaty and on the use of the immediate notification envisaged in the agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war between the USSR and the United States.

17 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev received Armand Hammer, a prominent member of the U.S. business community and the president and chairman of the board of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation. They discussed possible ways of developing mutually beneficial Soviet-American economic contacts. M. S. Gorbachev heartily thanked A. Hammer for his gift to the USSR--the original copy of a note written by V. I. Lenin in 1921.

18-20 -- Representatives of Soviet and American labor met in Washington to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. The Soviet side reaffirmed the need for the quickest possible cessation of armed intervention and all other types of outside interference in Afghan affairs.

24 -- A plenary session of the USSR and U.S. delegations was held at the talks on nuclear and space weapons.

26 -- Secretary V. P. Nikonov of the CPSU Central Committee received prominent American agricultural expert G. Kristal. They discussed the expansion of Soviet-American contacts in agriculture.

29 -- At the request of the American side, Soviet representatives at the talks on nuclear and space weapons met with U.S. Vice-President G. Bush in Geneva. The meeting included a brief discussion of the state of affairs at the talks.

July

3-11 -- A delegation representing the American Society of New England Newspaper Editors visited the Soviet Union as the guests of the Union of Journalists of the USSR; they attended the fourth annual meeting of Soviet and American journalists for a roundtable discussion in Suzdal.

The following meetings were held in Geneva as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

3, 10 --meetings of the group on strategic weapons;

3, 9, 11 -- meetings of the group on medium-range nuclear weapons;

9 -- meeting of the group on space weapons.

4 -- It was reported that General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan would meet in Geneva, Switzerland, on 19-20 November 1985 by mutual accord.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet sent President R. Reagan of the United States greetings on the national holiday of the United States, Independence Day.

11 -- A TASS statement was published condemning the U.S. Congress' decision to allocate funds for the production of binary chemical weapons.

13 -- A law considerably expanding the President's powers to use discriminatory commercial and economic practices in relations with the USSR and other socialist countries went into effect in the United States.

16 -- The second round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons ended with a plenary session of the USSR and U.S. delegations. The next round of the talks was scheduled to begin on 19 September 1985.

17 -- A ceremony was held in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in Washington to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Soviet-American Soyuz-Apollo program. It was attended by the Soviet and American space flight crews: A. Leonov and V. Kubasov, and T. Stafford, D. Slayton and V. Brand.

22 -- Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request. They discussed questions of bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States, including the projected meeting of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev with President R. Reagan of the United States. They also discussed some international issues of mutual interest.

30 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's statement on the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests from 6 August 1985 to 1 January 1986 was published. The statement said that the moratorium will remain in force if the United States also refrains from conducting nuclear tests.

In Washington U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz stated the American administration's reluctance to agree to the moratorium proposed by the USSR, as this is supposedly "not in the interests of the United States."

The Reagan Administration's intention to invite Soviet observers to the next underground tests of American nuclear weapons was announced in Washington.

31 -- E. A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz met in Helsinki and discussed problems in Soviet-American relations and vital international issues. The main topic of discussion was the upcoming Soviet-American summit meeting.

August

5 -- Ronald Reagan announced at a press conference in Washington that the United States refused to accept the USSR proposal on the declaration of a joint moratorium on nuclear tests. According to the President, the reasons for this decision were the need for the further testing of American nuclear weapons and the absence of an effective control mechanism.

6-13 -- A delegation from the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, headed by committee Chairman E. de la Garza, visited the Soviet Union as the guests of the USSR Parliamentary Group. The delegation spoke with representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and the USSR Ministry of Agriculture.

10-22 -- A U.S. delegation, headed by G. Savage, the Democratic congressman from Illinois, visited the Soviet Union as the guests of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies. Members of the delegation met with members of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet--IZVESTIYA editor-in-chief I. D. Laptev and Academician G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

14 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's answers to a TASS correspondent's questions regarding the USSR's declared unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions were published. M. S. Gorbachev again requested the U.S. administration to join the USSR in the process and, in general, to take a more constructive position on the total and universal nuclear test ban.

17 -- Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze sent the UN secretary-general a letter to propose the inclusion of the question of "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space Under the Conditions of Its Non-Militarization," the USSR proposals on the basic guidelines and principles of this kind of cooperation and the draft resolution of the UN General Assembly on this matter on the agenda of the 40th session of the General Assembly.

21 -- The U.S. State Department refused to allow a Soviet film crew to visit Vancouver (Washington) to work on a film on the world's first direct trans-polar flight from Moscow to America.

The White House announced its decision to test the antisatellite weapon in a simulated combat situation within the near future. President Reagan asserted that this test would supposedly "stimulate the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union" in Geneva.

22 -- The Soviet Embassy in Washington issued a protest to the State Department in connection with the dissemination of groundless allegations in the United States regarding the Soviet Union's use of "chemical substances for the surveillance of American Embassy personnel."

24 -- The U.S. President's national security adviser, R. McFarlane, presented a speech in Santa Barbara (California), pretentiously entitled "American-Soviet Relations at the End of the 20th Century" and containing a group of anti-Soviet lies.

27 -- Secretary V. P. Nikonov of the CPSU Central Committee received U.S. Secretary of Agriculture J. Block, who was visiting the USSR at the time. They discussed the present and future of Soviet-American cooperation in agriculture.

28 -- At the request of TIME, the American magazine, M. S. Gorbachev answered a number of questions and also received General Director H. Grunwald of Time Incorporated, TIME managing editor R. Cave, assistant managing editor R. Duncan and Moscow bureau chief J. Jackson. The Soviet press published M. S. Gorbachev's answers on 2 September.

29 -- A funeral ceremony was held in Augusta (Maine) for the 13-year-old schoolgirl Samantha Smith, who visited the USSR in 1983 as the guest of Soviet public organizations, and for her father Arthur Smith, after their tragic death in an airline disaster. A representative of the Soviet Embassy in the United States delivered a sympathy telegram from M. S. Gorbachev to Mrs. Jane Smith, Samantha's mother.

30 -- An organization of supporters of the nuclear freeze in Kansas City (Missouri) sent a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington with a request to convey its gratitude to M. S. Gorbachev for declaring a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

31 -- A delegation of U.S. senators, headed by R. Byrd, the leader of the Democratic Party faction in the Senate, visited Moscow as the guests of the USSR Parliamentary Group.

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